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Preface and Acknowledgements 
 
This report on Family Assets for Independence in Minnesota (FAIM) is funded by the Ford 
Foundation and the State of Minnesota.  Both deserve recognition for their commitment to 
research on IDAs.  Without research, we cannot learn whether IDAs are successful, for whom, 
and under what program circumstances.  Analyses in the FAIM study include both individual 
and institutional characteristics, so we can say something about both IDA programs and IDA 
participants in relation to savings performance. 
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this report.  In analytical approach and format, this report borrows considerably from our latest 
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States play an important role in policy innovation in the United States, often influencing federal 
policy.  Therefore, it is important to undertake policy research at the state level.  This is the first 
detailed study of a state-sponsored IDA program.  As such it offers a somewhat different 
perspective than the American Dream Demonstration (ADD), the only other detailed analytical 
study of IDAs at the present time.  Hopefully, more state IDA programs will be studied in the 
future.  
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Executive Summary 
 
 
While saving is not easy for anyone, it is more difficult for the poor because they have few 
resources relative to subsistence requirements and they lack access to some public-policy 
mechanisms that subsidize saving. 
 
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are designed to improve access to savings institutions 
for the poor.  Savings in IDAs are matched if used for home ownership, post-secondary 
education, or microenterprise.  Participants also receive financial education and support from 
IDA staff. 
 
Do IDAs work? Data from this study on Family Assets for Independence in Minnesota (FAIM) 
suggest that the poor can save and accumulate assets in IDAs: 
 
• Average monthly net deposits per participant were $25.00. 
 
• The average participant saved 85 percent of the monthly savings target (matchable amount). 
 
• The average participant made a deposit in 9 of every 12 months. 
 
• With a match rate of 3:1, participants accumulated about $100 per month or $1,200 per year 
in IDAs. 
 
 
Family Assets for Independence in Minnesota  
 
The Minnesota Community Action Agencies Association initiated IDA legislation in 
collaboration with Women Venture and the Wendell Phillips Federal Credit Union and with the 
support of several Indian Tribes.  The FAIM Pilot Project for IDAs was established by the 
Minnesota Legislature in 1998. 
 
The purpose of the FAIM Pilot Project is to help working poor Minnesotans to build wealth and 
to achieve long-term economic self-sufficiency.  FAIM is scheduled to run for four years (2000-
2003).  
 
Data 
 
This report contains quantitative data on FAIM programs and participants collected from the 
Management Information System for Individual Development Accounts (MIS IDA), a system 
designed and supported by the Center for Social Development at Washington University in St. 
Louis.  The University of Minnesota will provide qualitative data on FAIM. 
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Participant Characteristics 
 
Overall, participants are mostly “working poor” because FAIM targets this group.  This targeting 
is probably a large part of the explanation for the high level of education in FAIM and for the 
high proportion of people who had a bank account at enrollment.  Among the “working poor,” 
participants in FAIM are more disadvantaged in that they are disproportionately female, never-
married, and with children. 
 
Gender.  There were more females (83 percent) than males (17 percent). 
 
Age.  The average age at enrollment was 36, with a low of 17 and a high of 66.  About 92 
percent of participants were between 20 and 49 years of age. 
 
Race/ethnicity.  Thirty-five percent of FAIM participants were people of color.  Participants 
self-identified as African-American (16 percent), Asian-American or Pacific-Islander (2 
percent), Caucasian (65 percent), Latino or Hispanic (3 percent), Native American (11 percent), 
or “Other” (2 percent). 
 
Household type.  Most households had one adult with children (53 percent).  Other household 
types were one adult without children (11 percent), two or more adults with children (32 
percent), and two or more adults without children (4 percent). 
 
Education.  Looking at education, the highest grade completed was less than a high-school 
diploma (7 percent), a high-school diploma or GED (22 percent), some college but no degree (42 
percent), a 2-year college degree (9 percent), or a 4-year college degree or more (20 percent).  
Most participants (71 percent) attended some college.  Given their income, participants in FAIM 
were highly educated; 29 percent had a college degree of some sort, and 93 percent completed 
high school. 
 
Employment status.  Participants in FAIM had a high incidence of employment: 88 percent 
worked full-time or part-time.  Most FAIM participants were employed full-time (58 percent).  
Others were employed part-time (30 percent), unemployed (1 percent), not working (3 percent), 
a student and not working (1 percent), or a student and working (8 percent).  Not working 
includes homemakers, the retired, and the disabled.  Unemployed includes people who were laid-
off and are awaiting a call-back or who were seeking employment.  Almost all of the participants 
worked or were students (96 percent).   
 
Income/poverty level.  On average in FAIM, household income divided by the family-size-
adjusted poverty guideline was 105 percent (median 103 percent).1  About 14 percent of 
participants were under 50 percent of the poverty line, and 3 percent were over 200 percent of 
the poverty line.  
 
Welfare status.  We asked the participant had formerly received AFDC/TANF (63 percent) or 
received TANF at enrollment (12 percent).  Altogether, 64 percent of participants had received 
or were still receiving either AFDC or TANF. 
                                                           
1
 These data omit cases for which total income is missing. 
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Received SSI/SSDI.  Some FAIM participants received Supplemental Security Income or 
Supplemental Security Disability Insurance (10 percent). 
 
Received food stamps.  Some participants received food stamps (19 percent).  Altogether, 69 
percent of participants had received TANF, SSI/SSDI, and/or food stamps at enrollment or 
before. 
 
Passbook savings account.  In addition to the IDA, some FAIM participants had a passbook 
savings account (50 percent). 
 
Checking account.  More participants had a checking account (75 percent).  About 39 percent 
had both a passbook savings account and a checking account.  About 87 percent had at least one 
of the two types of savings accounts, so 13 percent were “unbanked.” 
 
Home ownership.  Some FAIM participants (owned a house 25 percent). 
 
Vehicle ownership.  More participants owned a vehicle (82 percent).     
 
Direct deposit.  Some participant used direct deposit into the IDA (15 percent).     
 
Health-insurance coverage.  Most participants had private health insurance or Medicaid (77 
percent).   
 
Life-insurance coverage.  Fewer  participants had life insurance (37 percent). 
 
 
Participation in FAIM 
 
Enrollment.  A participant is defined as someone who enrolled in FAIM and who had an 
account statement in MIS IDA.  As of March 31, 2001, FAIM had 513 participants.  
 
Exit.  About 16 percent of participants had exited without a matched withdrawal.  The 
cumulative risk of exit in the first 6 months was 6 percent, and it was 15 percent for the first 12 
months.  As of March 31, 2001, 84 percent of participants were active.  These and other 
outcomes will change over time. 
 
 
Savings Outcomes  
 
Following are the savings outcomes for FAIM as of March 31, 2001: 
 
Gross deposits.  The average participant had participated for 10.2 months and had gross deposits 
of $28.06 per month ($286 total).   
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Unmatched withdrawals.  About 20 percent of participants made unmatched withdrawals.  For 
participants who made unmatched withdrawals, the average number was 1.2, and the amount 
removed was $112.  With an average match rate of 3:1, this implies, on average, a cumulative 
loss of potential matches of about $336. 
 
Net deposits.  Net deposits are defined as deposits plus interest (net of fees) minus unmatched 
withdrawals.  Aggregate net deposits in FAIM were $135,165.  Net deposits per participant were 
$263.  The average monthly net deposit (AMND)—defined as net deposits divided by months of 
participation—was $25.00.  Median AMND was $30.10.  With a match rate of 3:1, the average 
participant in FAIM had accumulated about $100 per month. 
 
The match dollars that corresponded to net deposits was $405,495.  If all net deposits were used 
in matched withdrawals, total asset accumulation would be $540,660.  With exits included, this 
was $1,054 per participant; with exits excluded, it was $1,249 per participant.  
 
Matched withdrawals.  Eight participants, or 1.6 percent of FAIM participants, had a matched 
withdrawal as of March 31, 2001.  Four of these matched withdrawals represented participants 
who reached their IDA goal and “graduated” from the program.  The average value of a matched 
withdrawal was $213, and the average value of the matched withdrawal plus match per 
participant was $852.  Five matched withdrawals were for home purchase, and 3 were for post-
secondary education. 
 
About 98 percent of participants had no matched withdrawals as of March 31, 2000.  Of these, 
63 percent intended to buy a home, 22 percent intended to spend the money on microenterprise, 
and 15 percent planned for post-secondary education.   
 
Net deposits as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap.  On average, participants had net 
deposits of 85 percent of the monthly savings target.  At this pace, they will use 85 cents of every 
dollar of match eligibility. 
 
Deposit frequency.  On average, participants made a deposit in approximately 9 months per 
year.  Some evidence (Schreiner et al. 2001) suggests that frequent depositors accumulate more 
savings than infrequent depositors. 
 
Savings rate.  On average, AMND was 2.4 percent of monthly income (median 1.3 percent).  
 
Financial education.  Required financial education is a central feature of IDAs in FAIM.  The 
average participant attended 8.6 hours of general financial education.  Financial education was 
not associated with AMND.  About one-third of FAIM participants, however, had not attended 
any financial education classes as of March 31, 2001. 
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Participant Characteristics and Savings Outcomes 
 
The results summarized below are derived from multivariate regressions and control for a wide 
range of program and participants characteristics.  
 
Gender.  Gender had no link with savings. 
 
Race/ethnicity.  Compared to Caucasians, Native Americans were less likely to exit.  Strictness 
in enforcing rules related to exit might have influenced this result.  There were also some 
differences in AMND among the groups.  For example, compared with Caucasians, AMND was 
$7.00 less for Native Americans and $3.60 more for “Other.”  These differences were not due to 
race/ethnicity per se but rather to a constellation of socially produced characteristics correlated 
with both race/ethnicity and savings.   
 
Education.  Education was linked with the risk of exit, though not as might be expected.  People 
who completed high school or earned a GED were more likely to exit than people who did not 
complete high school.  AMND was highest for people who completed high school or earned a 
GED. 
 
Employment.  Employment status was associated with the risk of exit and saving performance, 
thought not as might be expected.  Compared to the full-time employed, students, the 
unemployed, and people who were not working both were less likely to exit and saved $3.00 
more. 
 
Receipt of public assistance.  About 69 percent of participants in FAIM had received some 
form of public assistance at enrollment or before.  People who received SSI/SSDI were less 
likely to exit than people who did not received SSI/SSDI.  Other than that, current and former 
receipt of public assistance was not associated with AMND.  
 
Income.  Average income/poverty in FAIM was 105 percent (median 103 percent).  The level of 
income was not associated with the risk of exit nor with AMND.  Therefore, participants with 
lower incomes saved at a higher rate (AMND/monthly income). 
 
Insurance coverage.  Health insurance did not have a statistically significant association with 
exit nor with AMND.  Life insurance was not associated with the risk of exit, but it was 
correlated with higher AMND. 
 
Asset ownership.  Participants who owned a checking account or a car were less likely to exit.   
Participants who owned a checking account, however, had lower AMND. 
 
Overall, the savings outcome results in FAIM so far are hopeful.  At the outset, the median net 
worth (assets minus liabilities) of participants was $10.00.  After an average of 10.2 months in 
the IDA program, they had accumulated assets (savings plus match) of more then $1,000.  Most 
said they wanted to purchase a home.  It will be interesting to see how many are successful in 
doing so. 
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Initial findings from FAIM will raise questions, spark debate, and inform policy.  The goal of 
this study and of future research—in FAIM and elsewhere—is to build knowledge about how 
programs that aim to encourage saving and asset accumulation can be more inclusive, successful, 
and generate greater net benefits. 
 Center for Social Development 
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1.  IDAs and FAIM in Minnesota 
 
 
A decade ago, Sherraden (1991) suggested that anti-poverty policy should promote not just 
income and consumption, but also savings and investment.  The theory was that the poor could 
save and accumulate assets if they had opportunities and incentives to do so.  Sherraden 
proposed progressive asset-building policy in the form of Individual Development Accounts 
(IDAs). 
 
Individual Development Accounts 
 
IDAs are subsidized savings accounts.  Unlike other subsidized savings accounts such as 
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) or 401(k) plans, IDAs are targeted to the poor, provide 
subsidies through matches rather than through tax breaks, and require participants to attend 
financial education.  Participants accrue matches as they save for purposes which build assets 
that increase long-term well-being and financial self-sufficiency.  Examples of matched uses of 
withdrawals include home purchase, post-secondary education, and microenterprise.  Funds may 
come from public or private sources, and funding partnerships are common.  IDAs are a 
conceptually simple community-development and public-policy tool that may be adapted to a 
wide range of applications and circumstances. 
 
Research was built into the design of IDAs in the United States (Sherraden et al., 1995).  The 
first large-scale, national test of IDAs is the American Dream Demonstration (ADD).  Over the 
course of the four-year demonstration, CSD has produced monitoring reports of the ongoing 
ADD research.  The most recent results are in Schreiner et al., 2001.  Recognizing the 
importance of evaluation, the State of Minnesota included research in their IDA plans.  Chapter 6 
of this report compares research results for the Family Assets for Independence in Minnesota 
(FAIM) Pilot Project with ADD. 
 
 
Family Assets for Independence in Minnesota 
 
In the 1998 state legislative session, the Minnesota Community Action Agencies Association 
initiated IDA legislation in collaboration with Women Venture and the Wendell Phillips Federal 
Credit Union and with the support of several Indian Tribes.  Through inclusion in the Children 
and Families omnibus legislation, the Minnesota Legislature passed the FAIM Pilot Project for 
IDAs into law. 
 
The FAIM Pilot Project Policies and Procedures Manual (2001) gives the following statement of 
purpose: 
 
The Family Assets for Independence in Minnesota (FAIM) Pilot Project exists to 
help working poor Minnesotans build wealth and achieve report long-term 
economic self-sufficiency.  It is believed that the combination of developing 
assets and increasing income over time will sustain economic self-sufficiency.  
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The mechanism for developing assets (purchase of a home, pursuit of a higher 
education, establishment of a small business) is matching the savings of 
participants.   
 
This research report contains quantitative data on FAIM programs and participants collected 
from the Management Information System for Individual Development Accounts (MIS IDA), a 
system designed and supported by the Center for Social Development at Washington University 
in St. Louis.  The University of Minnesota Family Social Science School, led by Dr. Jan Hogan, 
will provide qualitative information on FAIM. 
 
The FAIM Pilot Project is divided into eight geographic regions: 
 
• Northland Foundation Regional Cluster (Region 1) 
• Northwest Minnesota Foundation Regional Cluster (Region 2) 
• Minnesota Tribes (Region 3) 
• West Central Initiative (Region 4) 
• Initiative Fund Regional Cluster (Region 5) 
• Southwest Minnesota Foundation (Region 6) 
• Initiative Fund of South Central Minnesota Regional Cluster (Region 7) 
• Metro Area Regional Cluster (Region 8) 
 
Seven regions are in Greater Minnesota, six of which form the original McKnight Initiative Fund 
regions.  A seventh Greater Minnesota region is composed of the two participating Indian Tribes.  
The eighth region is in the seven-county metro area.   
 
FAIM operates through a statewide multi-site collaborative consisting of 23 Community Action 
Agencies (CAA), White Earth Indian Tribe, Leech Lake Indian Tribe, the City County Federal 
Credit Union, and WomenVenture.  The FAIM collaborative follows identical policies and 
procedures, financial education requirements for participants, data collection and reporting 
requirements, and the sharing of federal, state, and private funds for match requirements.  Its 
Council—consisting of representatives of CAAs and each of the partners—provides monitoring 
oversight.  Lead Agencies help coordinate activities of Site Agencies in each of 8 geographic 
regions.  The coordinators of each Site Agency meet regularly to coordinate activities, to collect 
lessons learned about the project, and to help solve problems that arise. 
 
For monitoring and reporting, individual Site Agencies report demographic data, and the 
financial institutions that hold the accounts report monthly savings information to Ramsey 
Action Programs (RAP), the Fiscal Agent.  In turn, MIS IDA produces a monthly statement that 
is mailed to participants and that shows the matchable balance, the corresponding match, and the 
matchable balance plus the match. 
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Staff members at RAP record three types of data in MIS IDA: 
 
• Demographic and socio-economic data on participants at enrollment. 
• Monthly IDA cash-flow data from account statements. 
• Intermittent events such as attendance at financial-education classes or program exit. 
 
Appendix B provides demographic and saving information for participants in each of the eight 
regions. 
 
 
Program Characteristics 
 
All FAIM Site Agencies follow the same general program rules and procedures.  The following 
information summarizes the structure of the FAIM Pilot Project. 
 
Account Structure 
 
Time cap.  The time cap is the number of months after opening an account in which a participant 
may make matchable deposits.  Although deposits after the time cap are not matchable, 
participants can still make matched withdrawals for six months after the time cap.  In FAIM, the 
time cap for each participant is based on the number of months from the date the account was 
opened through December 31, 2003.  The mean time cap was 45 months, with a low of 34 and a 
high of 48. 
 
Lifetime match cap.  Savings in FAIM are capped using a lifetime match-cap structure (this 
refers to the lifetime of the program, not the lifetime of the participant).  The lifetime match cap 
is the limit on the amount of matchable deposits possible before the time cap, and is calculated 
for each participant by multiplying $30 by the number of months that have expired before the 
time cap.  The mean match cap in FAIM was $1342.40. 
 
Monthly savings target.  The total match cap divided by the time cap.  In FAIM, the mean 
monthly savings target is $30.00.  The monthly savings target is the amount which, if saved each 
month and not removed in unmatched withdrawals, will produce net deposits equal to the total 
match cap in the last month before the time cap.  FAIM programs explicitly ask participants to 
save $30 a month. 
 
Match rate.  The number of dollars disbursed by the IDA program to a vendor for each dollar 
withdrawn in a matched withdrawal.  The match rate in FAIM is 3:1, or up to $1080.00 of match 
dollars per year, for a four (4) year period.  A combination of federal, state, and private dollars 
fund the match.  Federal matching dollars are provided through the Assets for Independence Act 
(AFIA).  Private funders are the Bush Foundation, Family Housing Fund, Greater Minnesota 
Housing Fund, Ecolab Foundation, St. Paul Companies, FirstStar Banks, TCF Foundation, 
Northland Foundation, Southwest Minnesota Foundation, United Way of the St. Paul Area, West 
Central Initiative Fund and The Minneapolis Foundation. 
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Matchable uses   
 
Approved uses of IDA match funds include: 
 
• Post secondary educational expenses 
• Home Purchase 
• Microenterprise 
 
 
Participants 
 
Enrollment in FAIM began in December 1999.  As of March 31, 2001, FAIM had 513 
participants. The mean number of participants per month is 347.5, with a low of 23 and a high of 
445. 
 
Financial Education 
 
Besides matches, a key feature of IDAs is required financial education.  Financial education in 
FAIM took two forms, general and asset-specific.  Program staff record hours attended by each 
participant.  All programs in FAIM require participants to complete a 28 hour-curriculum, 
Financial Strategies for Success.  Participants also work with coaches to help select the 
particular asset they want to purchase.  
 
General financial education.  The general financial education, or Dollar Works curriculum, 
totals 18 hours and includes topics such as credit/debt management, budgeting, credit repair, 
borrowing, and personal financial planning.  
 
Asset-specific education.  The 10 hours of asset-specific education covers Homestretch—First 
Time Home Buyer Education, Small Business, or Higher Education. 
 
 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
2.  Participant Characteristics 
 
 
This chapter describes characteristics of the 513 participants in FAIM as of March 31, 2001.  A 
participant is defined as an enrollee with at least one account statement in MIS IDA.  This 
excludes enrollees who never opened an account and enrollees who opened an account but who 
did not have an account statement in MIS IDA by March 31, 2001.  It includes enrollees who 
have account statements but who have exited without a matched withdrawal.  Participant 
characteristics are measured at enrollment. 
 
The characteristics of participants in FAIM are defined below and then summarized in Table 2.1. 
Overall, participants mostly come from the “working poor” because FAIM targets this group.  
This targeting is probably a large part of the explanation for the high level of education in FAIM 
and for the high proportion of people who had a bank account at enrollment.  Among the 
“working poor,” participants in FAIM are more disadvantaged in that they are disproportionately 
female, never-married, and with children. 
 
Participant Characteristics 
 
Demographics 
 
Gender.  Female (83 percent) or male (17 percent).  
 
Age.  The average age at enrollment was 36, with a low of 17 and a high of 66.  About 92 
percent of participants were between 20 and 49 years of age. 
 
Race/ethnicity.  Thirty-five percent of FAIM participants are people of color.  Participant self-
identification herself or himself as African-American (16 percent), Asian-American or Pacific-
Islander (2 percent), Caucasian (65 percent), Latino or Hispanic (3 percent), Native American 
(11 percent), or “Other” (2 percent).   
 
Residence.  Participant resides in an area with a population of 2,500 or more (66 percent) or with 
a population of less than 2,500 (34 percent). 
 
 
Household Composition 
 
Marital status.  Never-married (47 percent), married (25 percent), divorced or separated (27 
percent), or widowed (1 percent). 
 
Household type.  Whether the household had one adult with children (53 percent, and 95 
percent of these are single mothers with children), one adult without children (11 percent), two 
or more adults with children (32 percent), or two or more adults without children (4 percent). 
 
Children.  Number of people 17 years of age or younger in the household.  The average number 
of children was 1.9, and most households (86 percent) had at least one child. 
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Adults.  Number of people 18 years of age or older in the household.  The average number of 
adults was 1.4, and 64 percent of households had only one adult.  
 
 
Education and Employment 
 
Education.  Whether the highest grade completed corresponded to less than a high-school 
diploma (7 percent), a high-school diploma or GED (22 percent), some college but no degree (42 
percent), a 2-year college degree (9 percent), or a 4-year college degree or more (20 percent).  
Most participants (71 percent) attended some college.   
 
Employment status.  Whether employed full-time (58 percent), employed part-time (30 
percent), unemployed (1 percent), not working (3 percent), a student and not working (1 
percent), or a student and working (8 percent).  Not working includes homemakers, the retired, 
and the disabled.  Unemployed includes people who were laid-off and are awaiting a call-back or 
who were seeking employment.  Almost all of the participants worked or were students (96 
percent). 
 
Self-employed.  Whether the participant had a business or self-employment income (15 percent). 
 
 
Financial 
 
Income/poverty level.  On average in FAIM, household income divided by the family-size-
adjusted poverty guideline was 105 percent (median 103 percent).1  About 14 percent were under 
50 percent of the poverty line, and 3 percent were over 200 percent of the poverty line.  
 
Welfare status.  Whether the participant had formerly received AFDC/TANF (63 percent), or 
received TANF at enrollment (12 percent).  All together, 64 percent of participants had received 
either AFDC or TANF at or before enrollment. 
 
Received SSI/SSDI.  Whether the participant received Supplemental Security Income or 
Supplemental Security Disability Insurance (10 percent). 
 
Received food stamps.  Whether the participant received food stamps (19 percent).  All 
together, 69 percent of participants had received TANF, SSI/SSDI, and/or food stamps at 
enrollment or before. 
 
Passbook savings account.  Whether, in addition to the IDA, the participant had a passbook 
savings account (50 percent). 
 
Checking account.  Whether the participant had a checking account (75 percent).  About 39 
percent had both a passbook savings account and a checking account.  About 87 percent had at 
least one of the two types of savings accounts, so 13 percent were “unbanked.”      
                                                           
1
 These data omit cases for which total income is missing. 
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Home ownership.  Whether the participant owned a house (25 percent).     
 
Vehicle ownership.  Whether the participant owned a vehicle (82 percent).     
 
Direct deposit.  Whether the participant used direct deposit into the IDA (15 percent).     
 
Health-insurance coverage.  Whether the participant had private health insurance or Medicaid 
(77 percent).   
 
Life-insurance coverage.  Whether the participant had life insurance (37 percent). 
 
 
Relationship with Host Organization or Partner Organizations 
 
Previous relationship with host organization.  Whether the participant had received services 
from the host before FAIM (48 percent).   
 
Referred by partner organization.  Whether the participant was referred to the IDA program 
by a partner organization (14 percent).   
 
General financial education.  All sites in FAIM require general financial education.  The mean 
attendance was 8.6 hours, with a low of 0 and a high of 18.  Sites also offer asset-specific 
financial education.   
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Table 2.1 Participant Characteristics (N=513) 
 
Did not Complete High School 7
Completed High School or GED 22
Attended College 42
Completed 2-year Degree 9
Completed 4-year Degree or more 20
Employed Full-time 58
Employed Part-time 30
Unemployed 1
Not Working 3
Student, not Working 1
Student, also Working 8
Yes 15
No 85
0 to 49 14
50 to 74 14
75 to 99 18
100 to 124 17
125 to 149 16
150 to 174 11
175 to 199 4
200 to 686 3
Missing 3
Never 36
Formerly 63
Currently 12
Yes 19
No 80
Missing 1
Yes 10
No 88
Missing 1
Yes 77
No 21
Missing 3
Yes 37
No 60
Missing 3
Education and Employment
Financial
Education
Life-Insurance Coverage
Employment
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (%)
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Home Ownership
Yes 25
No 75
Vehicle Ownership
Yes 82
No 18
Home Purchase 63
Self-employment 22
Post-secondary Education 15
Yes 48
No 50
Missing 3
Yes 14
No 83
Missing 4
Yes 15
No 83
Missing 2
Passbook Savings Account 50
Checking 75
Both 39
Either 87
Zero 32
1 to 6 14
7 to 12 17
13 to 18 35
Missing 3
Hours of General Financial 
Previous Relationship with Host 
Referred by Partner Organization
Direct Deposit to IDA Account
Matchable Uses
Bank Account
    Gender %
Female 83
Male 17
Population 2,500 or more 66
Population less than 2,500 34
African-American 16
Asian-American or Pacific Islander 2
Caucasian 65
Hispanic 3
Native American 11
Other 2
13 to 19 1
20s 25
30s 40
40s 27
50s 6
60 to 72 1
Missing 1
Never Married 47
Married 25
Divorced or Separated 27
Widowed 1
One Adult with Children 53
One Adult without Children 11
Two or more Adults with Children 32
Two or more Adults w/o Children 4
1 64
2 33
3 2
4 0
5 or more 1
0 14
1 28
2 28
3 16
4 9
5 or more 4
Demographics
Household Composition
Household Type
Adults in Household
Children in Household
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
   Marital Status
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3. Enrollments, Deposits, Withdrawals, 
and Savings Outcomes 
 
 
This chapter presents data from FAIM through March 31, 2001, on enrollments, deposits, 
unmatched withdrawals, matched withdrawals, the uses of matched withdrawals, and other 
savings outcomes.  These outcomes matter not only because they suggest how people save in 
IDAs but also because they may inform efforts to expand access to IDAs.  For example, financial 
intermediaries that might hold IDAs would want to know the likely number, frequency, and size 
of deposits and withdrawals.  Likewise, new IDA programs might use the figures to plan and to 
set benchmarks. 
 
MIS IDA records the following information and savings outcomes for FAIM participants as of 
March 31, 2001: 
 
• FAIM had enrolled 513 participants. 
 
• Eight participants, or 1.6 percent, had made matched withdrawals. 
 
• About 20 percent of participants had made unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances. 
 
• Net deposits were, for the average participant, $263. 
 
• Net deposits plus match per participant were $1,054.  With a match rate of 3:1, participants 
accumulated about $1,200 per year in IDAs. 
 
• Average monthly net deposits per participant were $25.00. 
 
• The average participant made a deposit in 9 of 12 months. 
 
• The average participant saved 85 percent of the monthly savings target. 
 
• The savings rate for the average participant was 2.4 percent. 
 
 
Enrollments 
 
FAIM enrolled most of its participants (334), in the first six months.  As of March 31, 2001, 
cumulative enrollment was 513 (see Figure 3.1).  The goal of FAIM was to have 466 active 
participants over a four-year period.  FAIM had 513 participants cumulatively enrolled because 
some of the drop-outs have been replaced.    
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Deposits 
 
Net deposits in IDAs result from a number of types of cash flows, both deposits and withdrawals.  
Figure 3.2 depicts cumulative deposits and withdrawals in FAIM through March 31, 2001. 
 
Gross deposits are defined as cash flows into an IDA, including the interest net of bank fees.  As 
of March 31, 2001, cumulative gross deposits by the 513 participants in FAIM were $146,885 
(Figure 3.2 and Table 3.1).  All the participants but one had made a deposit, and the gross deposit 
per participant was $286.  The average length of participation was 10.2 months, and the average 
number of months per year with a deposit was 8.8 (deposit frequency was 73 percent).  Gross 
deposits per month in all months were $28.06 (median $30.00).  Excluding months without 
deposits, gross deposits per month were $38.28 (median $30.00). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1  Enrollments in FAIM (Cumulative) 
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Unmatched withdrawals of matchable balances are defined as cash flows out of an IDA back to 
a participant that could have been matched but that were withdrawn for a non-matchable use.  
There is a loss of the match unless the funds are re-deposited. As of March 31, 2001, cumulative 
unmatched withdrawals in FAIM were $11,720 (Table 3.1).  Twenty percent of the participants 
made these withdrawals, with 1.18 withdrawals per participant, each with an average value of 
$95 ($110 per participant with an unmatched withdrawal).  
 
Net deposits are defined as matchable balances, that is, gross deposits minus total unmatched 
withdrawals.  As of March 31, 2001, cumulative net deposits in FAIM were $135,165 (Figure 
3.2 and Table 3.1).  Average net deposits for all participants were $263.  The average monthly 
net deposit—defined as net deposits divided by months of participation—was $25.00 per 
participant, or 85 percent of the monthly savings target. 
 
The match rate per dollar of net deposits was 3:1, so the match that corresponded to net deposits 
was $405,495 (Table 3.1).  If all net deposits were to be used in matched withdrawals, total asset 
accumulation would be $540,660.  With exits included, this was $1,054 per participant; with 
exits excluded, it was $1,249 per participant.1  
 
Net deposits have two components:  match-eligible balances, and matched withdrawals. 
 
Match-eligible balances are defined as balances under the match cap (adjusted for previous 
matched withdrawals) that may be matched.  In FAIM as of March 31, 2001, the match-eligible 
balance was $133,461 (Figure 3.2 and Table 3.1).  The match rate per dollar of these balances 
was 3:1, so the potential match was $400,384 for a total potential asset accumulation of 
$533,845. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Participants will make more deposits and more unmatched withdrawals in the next three years 
before the end of FAIM, so this figure is not a good estimate of the asset accumulation that will 
take place in FAIM. 
Table 3.1 Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative Dollars) 
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match 
Gross deposits 146,885   
     
Total unmatched withdrawals (11,720)   
     
Net deposits 135,165 405,495 540,660 
    Matchable balances 133,461 400,384 533,845 
    Matched withdrawals 1,704 5,111 6,815 
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Matched withdrawals are defined as withdrawals for matchable uses.  Cumulative matched 
withdrawals in FAIM through March 31, 2001 were $1,704 (Figure 3.2 and Table 3.1).  The 
match rate per dollar of matched withdrawals was 3:1, so the match disbursed was $5,111.  
Cumulative actual asset accumulation through matched withdrawals was $6,815. 
 
 
 
 
Matched Withdrawals 
 
Only 8 participants, or 1.6 percent of the FAIM population, had a matched withdrawal as of 
March 31, 2001.  Four of these matched withdrawals were by participants who reached their IDA 
goal and exited the program.  The average value of a matched withdrawal was $213, and the 
average value of the matched withdrawal plus match per participant was $852.   
 
 
 
Figure 3.2  Deposits and Withdrawals (Cumulative Dollars) 
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The low number of matched withdrawals up to this time has two possible explanations.  First, the 
program has existed for only 15 months, and the average participant has been in the program for 
only 10 months. Usually matched withdrawals increase as participation lengthens because it 
takes time to build balances for a given planned use.  Second, the program does not expect 
people to withdraw at this stage, especially due to the program policies that discourage lump-
sum deposits and that force people to wait in order to take full advantage of all of their match 
eligibility.  Because their match eligibility increases with each year, they are more likely to wait 
longer to make matched withdrawals.   
 
Uses of matched withdrawals.  Matches are restricted to withdrawals used to invest in three 
main assets: a home, post-secondary education, or microenterprise.  As of March 31, 2001, 8 
participants in FAIM had a matched withdrawal.  Five were for home purchase, and 3 were for 
post-secondary education. 
 
Intended uses.  As of March 31, 2001, 98 percent of FAIM participants had not made a matched 
withdrawal.  Of these, 63 percent reported that they intended to buy a home.  About 15 percent 
intended to use their IDA for post-secondary education, and 22 percent intended to invest a 
microenterprise.   
 
 
Unmatched Withdrawals 
 
Unmatched withdrawals are all funds withdrawn that could have been matched but that were not 
matched; therefore, there is a loss or potential loss of match funds.  This includes funds 
withdrawn and not matched upon exit from FAIM, balances left in an account upon exit (when 
withdrawn, these funds will not be matched), and funds withdrawn but not matched during 
participation.   
 
As of March 31, 2001, 20 percent of participants had unmatched withdrawals (1.18 withdrawals 
per participant with an unmatched withdrawal). The average unmatched withdrawal was worth 
$95 ($112 per participant with an unmatched withdrawal).  Total unmatched withdrawals in 
FAIM were $11,719 (Table 3.2).  On average, participants with unmatched withdrawals had 
gross deposits of $170 and withdrawals of $110 (65 percent of their gross deposits).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2  Unmatched Withdrawals 
Item Total 
Value ($) 11,719 
Number 124 
Percentage of Participants with a Withdrawal 20 
Average Amount Withdrawn 95 
Withdrawals per Participant with a Withdrawal 1.18 
Value per Participant with a Withdrawal ($) 112 
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Twenty percent of the participants had unmatched withdrawals in an average of 10.2 months of 
participation.  Without these withdrawals and with all else constant, average AMND would 
increase 9 percent (from $25.00 to $27.25).  Given the average match rate of 3:1, the average 
unmatched withdrawal of $86 cost $258 in lost cumulative potential matches. 
 
 
Savings Outcomes 
 
Savings and asset accumulation in IDAs are built up from several elements.  Deposits and 
interest increase balances; fees and withdrawals (matched or unmatched) decrease balances.  
Match rates affect total accumulation, and income affects the level of resources available to be 
saved. 
 
No single number captures everything about each element.  We define six measures to 
summarize the combined effects of different elements on savings outcomes in FAIM: net 
deposits, net deposits plus match, average monthly net deposits, deposit frequency, net deposits 
as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap, and savings rate.  
 
 
Net Deposits 
 
Net deposits are defined as deposits plus interest (net of fees) minus unmatched withdrawals.  
The measure includes matched withdrawals, but it excludes deposits in excess of the match cap 
or deposits after the time cap.  Unmatched withdrawals are savings in an IDA account, but they 
cannot be matched, so they are not counted as net deposits.2 
 
Net deposits measure assets accumulated in an IDA up to a point in time.  Greater net deposits 
imply greater asset accumulation.  The measure does not account, however, for differences in the 
length of participation, time caps, or the timing of cash flows.  The definition of net deposits also 
ignores the possibility of future unmatched withdrawals from current balances. 
 
Average net deposits in FAIM as of March 31, 2001 were $263.  The median was $331.3  The 
smallest net deposit was -$0.18, and the largest net deposit was $783.  About 16 percent (80 
participants) of participants had exited without a matched withdrawal (and so had zero net 
deposits), and 1.4 percent (7 participants) had zero net deposits but had not exited.4  
Net deposits is not a very useful measure, however, because it does not control for length of 
participation; all else constant, participants who started sooner will have higher net deposits. 
The box on the next page illustrates savings outcomes (including net deposits) for a hypothetical 
IDA. 
                                                 
2
 For the same reason, net deposits are zero for participants who exit without a matched 
withdrawal, even if their account has a balance on exit. 
3
 The median has the same number of participants above it as below it. 
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Savings Outcomes for a Hypothetical IDA 
 
To illustrate the measures of savings outcomes, Table 3.3 shows cash flows for a hypothetical 
IDA account.  Figure 3.3 depicts the evolution of the balance.   
 
The example participant opened the account on January 1.  The match rate was 3:1, the match-
cap structure was annual, the annual match cap was $300, the time cap was 12 months, the total 
match cap was $300, and there were no fees.  The first deposit of $100 was on February 1.  On 
March 1, $1.00 of interest (a monthly rate of 1 percent) was credited. (The unrealistically high 
interest rate of one percent per month is used here only for illustration. The hypothetical example 
is not meant to represent the typical experience in FAIM in any way.)  On April 1, there was an 
unmatched withdrawal of $25 and an interest credit of $1.01.  On May 1, the participant 
deposited $50, and $0.77 in interest was credited.  Finally, on June 1, five months after the 
account was opened, interest of $1.28 was credited, and the participant closed the account with a 
matched withdrawal of $129.06. 
 
In this example, net deposits were $129.06.  This is the sum of deposits ($100 + $50 = $150) and 
interest ($1.00 + $1.01 + $0.77 + $1.28 = $4.06), minus unmatched withdrawals ($25). 
 
Table 3.3  Cash Flows in a Hypothetical IDA in Dollars 
Date Deposit Interest Matched withdrawal Unmatched withdrawal Balance 
Jan. 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Feb. 1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
March 1 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 101.00 
April 1 0.00 1.01 0.00 25.00 77.01 
May 1 50.00 0.77 0.00 0.00 127.78 
June 1 0.00 1.28 129.06 0.00 0.00 
      
Total 150.00 4.06 129.06 25.00 N/A 
Monthly interest is 1 percent, the match rate is 3:1, the total match cap is $300, and the time cap is 12 months. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4
 All of these cases had made deposits but then had removed them in unmatched withdrawals. 
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Figure 3.3  Evolution of the Balance of a Hypothetical IDA  
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Net Deposits plus Match 
Net deposits plus match is defined as net deposits plus the corresponding match.5 Net deposits 
plus match includes any previous matched withdrawals. This measure tells the asset 
accumulation that would take place through IDAs if all net deposits were removed in matched 
withdrawals. 
 
Example:  Net Deposits plus Match 
 
In the hypothetical example, net deposits were $129.06, and the match rate was 3:1.  Net deposits 
plus match were thus $516.24, found as $129.06 + 3 
 
 
The average net deposits plus match in FAIM were $1,054, and the median was $1,323.  The 
smallest net deposit plus match was -$0.18, and the largest net deposit plus match was $3,131.   
Like net deposits, the measure of net deposits plus match has some drawbacks.  It does not 
control for length of participation, and it depends on the match rate, which is not an outcome of 
participant behavior but rather an element of the institutional structure set by the program. 
 
Average Monthly Net Deposit 
Average monthly net deposit (AMND) is defined as net deposits per month of participation for a 
participant.  AMND is the key measure of savings outcomes in this report.  Unlike net deposits, 
AMND controls for the length of time that a participant has had the opportunity to save.  All else 
constant, greater AMND implies greater asset accumulation. 
 
Example:  Average Monthly Net Deposit 
 
The example participant was in the IDA program for 5 months.  Net deposits were $129.06, so 
the average monthly net deposit for this example participant was $25.81, found as $129.06 / 5. 
 
 
For FAIM as of March 31, 2001, average AMND was $25.00.  Thus, a year of participation 
produced net deposits of $300.  If these patterns hold, then with the average match rate of 3:1, 
participants will accumulate about $1,200 in one year.  If they continue at this pace and stay in 
the program for 45 months (the average time cap), then they will accumulate $4,500.  Median of 
AMND $30.10.  Among the eight geographic regions, AMND ranged from a low of $15.24 to a 
high of $30.21 (Table 3.4). 
 
                                                 
5
 Of course, some current balances may eventually be removed as unmatched withdrawals. 
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Deposit Frequency 
 
Deposit frequency is defined as the number of months with a deposit divided by the number of 
months of participation.  It shows how steadily a participant saves through time.  A participant 
with a deposit each month has a deposit frequency of 100 percent.  As a participant misses 
months, the measure gets smaller; someone with no deposits at all has a frequency of zero.  
Deposits of accrued interest are ignored; if not, frequency would be 100 percent for most 
participants. 
 
 
Example:  Deposit Frequency 
 
The example participant made deposits in 2 of 5 months, so deposit frequency was 40 percent. 
 
 
The mean deposit frequency for FAIM was 72 percent, and the median was 80 percent.  The 
typical IDA participant made a deposit in about nine of the twelve months.  Deposit frequency  
among the regions varies between 48 percent and 88 percent (Table 3.4). 
 
Greater deposit frequency may lead to higher AMND; Chapter 5 suggests that a move from the 
25th percentile in frequency (53 percent) to the 75th percentile (100 percent) was linked with an 
increase in AMND of $10.34.  This is not a strong result, however, because saving may cause 
frequency, even if frequency also causes saving.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Table 3.4  Savings Outcomes by Geographic Region 
 
 
AMND ($) Deposit Frequency (%) 
Northland Foundation Regional Cluster (1) 28.83 81 
Northwest Minnesota Foundation Regional Cluster (2) 25.46 81 
Minnesota Tribes (3) 15.24 48 
West Central Initiative (4) 26.80 74 
Initiative Fund Regional Cluster (5) 27.88 74 
Southwest Minnesota Foundation (6) 25.04 75 
Initiative Fund of South Central Minnesota Regional Cluster (7) 30.21 88 
Metro Area Regional Cluster (8) 26.04 72 
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Net Deposits as a Percentage of the Pro-rated Match Cap 
 
Net deposits as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap is defined as the ratio of average 
monthly net deposits to the monthly savings target.  The monthly savings target is the total match 
cap divided by the time cap, that is, the amount that, if deposited each month and not removed as 
an unmatched withdrawal, would lead to net deposits equal to the lifetime match cap in the 
month of the time cap.  In FAIM, the monthly savings target is $30.00. 
 
 
Example:  Net Deposits as a Percentage of the Pro-rated Match Cap 
 
For the example participant, the monthly savings target is $25, found as the match cap of $300 
divided by the time cap of twelve months.  Because the average monthly net deposit was $25.81, 
the proportion of the savings goal was 103 percent, found as $25.81 / $25.  The participant was 
slightly ahead of the pace required to use all match eligibility before the 12-month time cap. 
 
 
The measure of net deposits as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap indicates the closeness of 
actual saving behavior to that which would take full advantage of match incentives.  A measure 
of 100 percent indicates that a participant is on track to use all match eligibility.  Measures above 
100 percent are possible if deposits are on a pace to exceed the total match cap or if a participant 
has an annual match-cap structure and has deposited more than would be matched if participation 
were to end after the current participation-year.   
 
For FAIM the net deposits were, on average, 85 percent of the pro-rated match cap, and the 
median was 100 percent.  That is, the average participant saved 85 cents for every dollar of 
match eligibility. 
 
Savings Rate 
 
The savings rate is defined as the ratio of the average monthly net deposit to gross monthly 
household income.  It measures the rate at which inflows of resources are converted into IDA 
deposits. 
 
 
Example:  Savings Rate 
 
If the example participant had a monthly household income of $1,250, then net deposits as a 
percentage of income would be about 2.1 percent, found as $25.81 / $1,250. 
 
 
The average savings rate for FAIM was 2.4 percent, and the median was 1.9 percent.  The largest 
saving rate was 33.4 percent, which is probably caused by someone who understated her/his 
income or who had unusually low income in the month of enrollment. 
Center for Social Development 
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4.  Exits 
 
 
Exits are participants who leave a program without having taken a matched withdrawal.  Exits 
have zero net deposits in IDAs; balances are removed as unmatched withdrawals or become 
unmatchable once the participant leaves the program.1  
 
Exits matter for IDA policy because they are costly; programs lose their investment in 
participants, and participants lose potential match funds.  Participants may also become 
discouraged with saving in general.  How common is exit, and what institutional and participant 
characteristics are associated with it? 
 
In the context of FAIM, answers might serve two main purposes.  First, they set a benchmark 
and give programs an idea of the rate of exit that they can expect through time.  Second, they 
suggest how participant characteristics are linked with exit; programs might then target extra 
help to the participants who are most at-risk.   
This chapter discusses the concept of exit, exit in FAIM, and links between exit and the 
characteristics of programs and participants.  About 16 percent of enrollees in FAIM had exited 
as of March 31, 2001.  The cumulative risk of exit was 6 percent in the first 6 months and 15 
percent in the first 12 months.   
The following are key links found between exit and characteristics of programs and participants: 
• The risk of exit was not associated with gender. 
• The risk of exit was not associated with the level of income. 
• Receipt of public assistance was not associated with the risk of exit (although recipients of 
SSI/SSDI were less likely to exit). 
• Participants older than 40, students, the unemployed, and people who are not working had 
less risk of exit than participants younger than 40, and full-time employees.  People who 
completed high school were more likely to exit than people who did not complete high 
school. 
• For each adult in the household, the risk of exit increases. 
• Owners of checking accounts and/or owners of cars had a lower risk of exit than people who 
did not own a checking account and/or a car.   
• Participants who used direct deposit to their IDA had a lower risk of exit compared with 
people who did not use direct deposit.  
                                                 
1
 Exits still saved and maintained assets for a time, but they also dissaved or became ineligible 
for matches, so net IDA deposits are zero. 
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• Unobserved factors correlated with a given program were associated with the risk of exit. 
 
Exits, Graduates, Actives, Kick-outs, and Ineligibles2 
 
Definitions and Percentages 
 
Exits are defined as participants who leave an IDA program without having taken a matched 
withdrawal.3  For exits, net deposits are zero by definition.  In FAIM as of March 31, 2001, 16 
percent of participants had exited. 
 
Graduates are defined as participants who leave an IDA program sometime after having taken a 
matched withdrawal.  Graduates have positive net deposits.  In FAIM as of March 31, 2001, 
about half of the 1.6 percent of participants with a matched withdrawal had graduated.  
 
Actives are defined as people who have an IDA open.  In FAIM as of March 31, 2001, 84 percent 
of enrollees were active.  About 98 percent of actives had positive net deposits (1.6 percent made 
deposits and removed all of them in unmatched withdrawals but yet did not exit). 
 
Kick-outs break rules and are forced out of IDA programs.  For example, kick-outs might miss 
classes, fail to meet a minimum deposit frequency, exceed a maximum number of unmatched 
withdrawals, or fail to save a minimum amount.  Even if kick-outs save something and leave 
with a balance in their account, they have zero net deposits because they cannot make matched 
withdrawals.  An unknown share of participants treated as exits in this report are kick-outs. 
 
Ineligibles open an IDA and then leave because it was discovered that they failed to meet 
eligibility requirements. In the analysis of FAIM here, people who moved are also counted as 
ineligible because they left for reasons unrelated to saving behavior.  Ineligibles have zero net 
deposits by constraint; the 15 known ineligibles in FAIM are excluded from the 513 participants 
analyzed in this report. 
 
 
Exits in FAIM 
 
About 16 percent of enrollees in FAIM had exited as of March 31, 2001.  Deposit frequency for 
exits (41 percent) was about half that of non-exits (78 percent).  Average AMND for non-exits 
was $29.61; because exits removed all their deposits in unmatched withdrawals, average AMND 
for exits was zero by definition.  On average, matchable deposits were higher for non-exits 
($317) than for exits ($116). 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Exits might also be called drop-outs. 
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Exit, Institutional Characteristics, and Participant Characteristics 
 
How are institutional and participant characteristics associated with exit? The results below may 
help programs to adjust institutional design and to target support. 
 
 
Regression Model 
 
Since the dependent variable (non-exit) in the regression is dichotomous (unity for non-exits, 
zero for exits), a probit model is used (Kennedy, 1998).  Because the probit estimates do not 
have a direct interpretation, they are converted to units of percentage points (one percentage 
point is 1/100, or 0.01) of change in the predicted risk of non-exit given a unit change in an 
independent variable.4  If the estimated change linked to a unit increase in an independent 
variable is positive, then the likelihood of non-exit increases (decreases the likelihood of exit).  
Negative estimates imply decreases in the likelihood of non-exit (increases in the likelihood of 
exit).  The model uses 487 observations (26 were omitted due to missing values).   
 
The probit model includes an unusually large number of control variables: 2 institutional 
characteristics, and 29 participant characteristics.5  Because some characteristics are categorical 
and because some continuous characteristics are specified as piece-wise linear splines (Suits, 
Mason, and Chan, 1978), 67 parameters are estimated.6 
 
The regression tables contain the means of the characteristics in the model, the change in 
percentage points, and the p-value.  Appendix A discusses these concepts in detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 The percentage-point changes are computed at the means of the independent variables. 
Standard errors are computed with the delta method (Greene, 1993). 
5
 Characteristics were selected if they were in MIS IDA, were expected to influence exit, had 
sufficient variation, and were unlikely to be caused by exit.   
6
 Approximately 56 percent of participants have missing values for at least one of the 31 
variables included in the model.  The standard practice that omits participants with any missing 
characteristics would have severely hampered regression.  Instead, we use a set of dummy 
variables to cleanse the estimates of the effects of missing values (Orme and Reis, 1991).  If a 
characteristic is not missing, then the “missing” dummy that corresponds to the characteristic is 
set to zero.  If the characteristic is missing, then the “missing” dummy is set to unity and the 
characteristic is set to zero.  The estimate for the characteristic reflects only non-missing values.  
The coefficients of the “missing” dummies are available on request. 
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Institutional Characteristics 
 
 
Table 4.1  Institutional Characteristics 
  Probability of Non-exits 
Independent Variable Mean  p-value 
     
Programs    
Western Community Action (6) 0.027 0 1.00 
Inter-County Community Council (2) 0.018   
Northwest Community Action (2) 0.021   
Leech Lake Tribe (3) 0.051   
White Earth Tribe (3) 0.035   
West Central MN CA (4) 0.041   
Prairie Five Community Action Council (6) 0.008   
Freeborn Community Action (7) 0.012   
Scott-Carver-Dakota CAP (8) 0.039   
Community Development Federal Credit Union (8) 0.045   
Community Action of Minneapolis (8) 0.084   
Community Action Program Duluth (1) 0.043 -4 0.34 
Suburban Hennpin Community Action (8) 0.043 -6 0.18 
Bi-County CAP (2) 0.019 -7 0.13 
Tri-County Action Program (5) 0.076 -8 0.01 
Southwestern MN Opportunity Council (6) 0.018 -8 0.05 
Women Venture (8) 0.06 -8 0.02 
Otter Tail-Wadena Community Action Council (5) 0.029 -9 0.03 
Heartland Community Action (6) 0.041 -9 0.02 
Ramsey Action Programs (8) 0.07 -9 0.01 
Anoka County Community Action Program (8) 0.051 -9 0.01 
Tri-Valley Opportunity Council (2) 0.018 -10 0.03 
Clay-Wilkin Opportunity Council (4) 0.021 -10 0.02 
Minnesota Valley Action Council (7) 0.06 -10 0.01 
KOOTASCA Community Action (1) 0.027 -11 0.01 
Olmsted Community Action Program (7) 0.014 -13 0.02 
AEOA (1) 0.029 -15 0.01 
The FAIM Pilot Project geographic region is in parentheses. 
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Unobserved factors correlated with a given site.  The regression controls for the possible 
effects on exit of unobserved factors correlated with a given site.7  For example, the strictness of 
rule enforcement is unobserved.  All else constant, a strict program might have higher exit (due 
to kick-outs), but the model does not control for strictness directly. 
 
Because they had reported no exits, estimates for ten sites are set to zero and serve as the base of 
comparison. 
 
The difference between the effects of unobserved factors between a non-reference site and the 
ten reference sites is the figure reported as the “change in % points” for the non-reference site.  
For example, compared with unobserved factors at these ten sites, unobserved factors at 
KOOTASCA Community Action were linked with a statistically significant, 11 percentage-point 
increase in the risk of exit (Table 4.1).  Most pair-wise comparisons are large and statistically 
significant.8  
 
The difference between the effects of unobserved factors between two non-reference sites is the 
difference between the figures corresponding to those two sites in the “change in % points” 
column in Table 4.1.  For example, unobserved factors at site Community Action Program 
Duluth has, compared to the ten reference sites, an effect of – 4 percentage points, and site Tri-
Valley Opportunity Council has an effect of –10 percentage points.  Thus, the difference in the 
effect of unobserved factors between sites Community Action Program Duluth and Tri-Valley 
Opportunity Council is 6 percentage points.  
 
In a sense, these estimates summarize what we do not know.  For example, exit at Otter Tail–
Wadena Community is 1 percentage point more likely—other factors in the model constant—
than exit at the Tri-County Action Program.  We know that this is due to omitted factors 
correlated both with exit and with the specific site, but we do not know what those omitted 
factors are.  Some omitted factors are institutional, for example, strictness with rules and quality 
of staff.  Some omitted factors pertain to participants; for example, people at one site may have 
more experience saving and thus be less likely to exit.  Some omitted factors go beyond 
programs and participants; for example, home prices vary by region and may affect the 
usefulness of IDAs for home purchase and thus the risk of exit.  Likewise, unemployment varies 
by region and may affect precautionary motives to save.  
 
                                                 
7
 Participant characteristics may also vary in systematic-but-unobserved ways that are correlated 
both with a given site and with exit.  For example, if a given program targets people who have 
declared bankruptcy, if bankruptcy constricts access to loans, and if constricted access to loans 
increases exit because debt cannot buffer shocks (or because IDA balances are seized by 
creditors), then exit from this program will be more likely than elsewhere.  The estimates in 
Table 4.1 reflect the effects of such unobserved participant characteristics as well as the effects 
of unobserved program characteristics. 
8
 We have not tested pair-wise comparisons between pairs of programs in which one of the pairs 
was not the 10 reference sites. 
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Participant Characteristics 
 
This section describes the associations between exit and participant characteristics.  Unless 
otherwise noted, this section will discuss only the results with a confidence level of 90 percent or 
more. 
 
 
Participant Demographics. No statistically significant differences were observed in the 
likelihood of exit between males and females (See Table 4.2). 
 
Participants older than 40 were 0.35 percentage points less likely to exit for each year beyond 40 
(90-percent confidence, Table 4.2).  For example, a 50-year-old is 3.5 percentage points less 
likely to exit than a 40-year-old.  
 
For each adult in the household, the risk of exit increases by 3.1 percentage points (95-percent 
confidence, Table 4.2).   
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Table 4.2  Participant Demographics 
  Probability of Non-exits 
Independent Variable Mean  p-value 
     
Gender    
Male 0.17   
Female 0.83 -0.5 0.80 
     
Age (spline) 36   
0 to 40 years  -0.20 0.14 
40 years or more   0.35 0.10 
     
Location of residence    
Population 2,500 or more 0.66   
Population less than 2,500 0.34  2.4 0.15 
     
Marital status    
Married 0.25  4.0 0.13 
Never-married 0.47   
Divorced, separated, or widowed 0.29 -0.2 0.88 
     
Household composition 3.3   
Adults (18 or older) 1.4 -3.1 0.05 
Children (17 or younger) 1.9  0.31 0.56 
     
Race/ethnicity    
African-American 0.16 -2.5 0.19 
Native American 0.11  7.5 0.05 
Other 0.07 0.6 0.82 
Caucasian 0.65   
 
 
The risk of exit was statistically the same for African Americans, Caucasians, and “Other” 
(Table 4.2).  This suggests that the large differences in gross AMND among these groups 
(Chapter 5) were not due to differences in the risk of exit.  Compared to Caucasians, Native 
Americans were 7.5 percentage points less likely to exit.  Strictness in how programs enforce 
rules related to exit may influence this result. 
 
 
Education and Employment.  Although people with more education and people with full-time 
jobs might be expected to save more and to have lower risk of exit than people with less 
education and people without full-time jobs, FAIM results show the opposite.  People who 
completed high school or who earned a GED were 4.6 percentage points (89-percent confidence, 
Table 4.3) more likely to exit than people who did not complete high school.  Moreover, 
26  Family Assets for Independence in Minnesota (FAIM), Research Report 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
students, the unemployed, and people who were not working were 3.9 percentage points less 
likely to exit than the full-time employed (90-percent confidence, Table 4.3).   
 
Table 4.3  Education and Employment Status 
  Probability of Non-exits 
Independent Variable Mean  p-value 
     
Education    
Did not graduate from high school 0.07   
Completed high school or earned GED 0.22 -4.6 0.11 
Attended college but did not graduate 0.42 -2.0 0.42 
Graduated from 2-year college 0.09  -0.46 0.90 
Graduated from 4-year college 0.20  -0.6 0.84 
        
Employment       
Students, unemployed, and not working 0.13 3.9 0.10 
Employed, part-time (< 35 hours per week) 0.30 1.4 0.35 
Employed, full-time (> 35 hours per week) 0.58     
 
 
Receipt of Public Assistance and Income.  On the whole, exit was not found to be strongly 
linked with public-assistance programs such as TANF and food stamps.  However, people who 
received SSI/SSDI were 5.6 percentage points less likely to exit (94-percent confidence, Table 
4.4).   
 
The average participant in FAIM reported monthly household income at enrollment of $1,431.  
Of this, $1,267 (89 percent) came from “recurrent” sources (wages, retirement benefits, and 
public assistance), and $169 (11 percent) came from “intermittent” sources (self-employment, 
child support, gifts, investments, and “other”).  Regardless of the source, the level of income had 
no statistically significant link with the risk of exit (Table 4.4).   
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Table 4.4  Public Assistance and Income 
  Probability of Non-exits 
Independent Variable Mean  p-value 
     
Receipt of public assistance    
TANF or AFDC never 0.36   
TANF or AFDC formerly 0.64  0.0 0.98 
    
No TANF currently 0.88   
TANF currently 0.12  1.7 0.45 
     
No SSI/SSDI 0.90   
Receives SSI/SSDI 0.10  5.6 0.06 
       
No food stamps 0.81     
Receives food stamps 0.19 -1.7 0.36 
    
Household income ($100/month)    
Recurrent income (spline) 12.7     
0 to $799  -0.12 0.78 
$800 or more   0.11 0.54 
        
Intermittent income 1.7 -0.18 0.45 
Means taken over only non-missing observations.       
 
 
Assets, Liabilities, and Insurance.  For several reasons, people with passbook savings accounts 
and/or checking accounts might be expected to save more and exit less for several reasons.  First, 
the mere presence of an account may signal some level of financial sophistication or future 
orientation.  Second, the balance in an account can be shifted into IDAs or used to buffer shocks.  
The regression results indicate that the presence of a passbook savings account had no 
statistically significant association with exit.  However, an additional $100 in the passbook 
savings account (given the presence of an account) was associated with a decrease in the risk of 
exit of 0.27 percentage points (93-percent confidence, Table 4.5).   
 
More than passbook savings, checking accounts mark a greater integration with formal financial 
services (Hogarth and Lee, 2000; Dunham, 2000).  The presence of a checking account was 
associated with a decrease of 2.7 percentage points in the risk of exit (88-percent confidence, 
Table 4.5).  Although the link is not particularly large or strong, they suggest that people with 
checking accounts were less likely to exit from FAIM. 
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Other than human capital, homes and cars are the chief illiquid assets of the poor.  Like the 
presence of liquid assets, the presence of illiquid assets may proxy for unobserved factors linked 
with higher savings.  For example, people who saved to buy a house or car in the past are 
probably likely to save more in IDAs than others.  Illiquid assets are more difficult than liquid 
assets to shift into IDAs; few people would sell their cars or homes to get cash for IDA deposits.   
Compared with people who do not own a car, car owners in FAIM were 3.6 percentage points 
less likely to exit (91-percent confidence, Table 4.5), perhaps because they could drive to make 
deposits.   
 
 
Table 4.5  Assets, Liabilities, and Insurance 
  Probability of Non-exits 
Independent Variable Mean  p-value 
     
Liquid assets    
No passbook savings account 0.50   
Owned passbook savings account 0.50 -0.69 0.59 
        
Balance in passbook savings account ($100s) 2.17 0.27 0.07 
        
No checking account 0.25     
Owned checking account 0.75 2.7 0.12 
        
Balance in checking account ($100s) 2.50 0.11 0.54 
        
Illiquid assets       
Renter 0.74     
Home owner 0.26 -1.6 0.54 
        
No car 0.17     
Car owner 0.83 3.6 0.09 
        
Value of illiquid assets ($100s) 174 0.001 0.81 
        
Liabilities       
No debt 0.60     
Some debt 0.40 -2.4 0.39 
        
Value of liabilities ($100s) 160 -0.0026 0.57 
        
Insurance coverage       
No health insurance 0.21     
Had health insurance 0.79 0.65 0.70 
        
No life insurance 0.61     
Had life insurance 0.39 1.3 0.38 
Means taken over only non-missing observations.     
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Enrollment Characteristics.  The regression suggests that the likelihood of non-exit is 
associated with months of participation.  In the first 6 months in the program, participants were 
0.7 percentage points more likely to exit with each additional month (although confidence is only 
78-percent, Table 4.6).  Between 7 to 12 months, participants were 1.6 percentage points less 
likely to exit (99-percent confidence), and between 13 to 15 months, participants were 2.1 
percent points less likely to exit (although the confidence level is only 82-percent) with each 
additional month. 
 
Length of participation should be viewed not as a cause but as a control.  As time passes, exit 
may slow because savers have greater potential matches to lose.  Survivor bias also plays a role; 
participants unlikely to exit, regardless of length of participation, are also likely to have 
participated the longest as of March 31, 2001.  It is also possible that the likelihood of exit 
decreases with time because participants become more hopeful of success as they go longer 
without exiting and build larger balances. 
 
 
Table 4.6  Enrollment Characteristics 
  Probability of Non-exits 
Independent Variable Mean  p-value 
Previous relationship with host org.       
No 0.51     
Yes 0.49 -2.0 0.19 
        
Referred by partner organization       
No 0.86     
Yes 0.14 -1.80 0.32 
        
Length of participation (months) 10.2     
1 to 6  -0.7 0.22 
7 to 12  1.6 0.01 
13 to 15  2.1 0.18 
Means taken over only non-missing observations.   
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Finally, institutional theory suggests that direct deposit may increase savings because it removes 
the need to make recurrent choices to save (Bernheim, 1997; Beverly, Moore, and Schreiner, 
2001; Beverly and Sherraden, 1999; Caskey, 1997; Thaler, 1990).  Direct deposit was linked 
with a decrease in the risk of exit of 10 percentage points (99-percent confidence, Table 4.7).  
 
Caveat.  Some unknown share of these estimates captures links between exit and unobserved 
factors correlated with participant demographics.  As such, the characteristics are viewed more 
as controls than as causes.  For example, gender and race are included not to test for genetic 
predisposition to save in IDAs but rather to control the possible correlation of gender and race 
with unobserved, omitted factors produced in the social context. 
 
 
Table 4.7  Characteristics Determined after Enrollment 
  Probability of Non-exits 
Independent Variable Mean  p-value 
Use of direct deposit to IDA account       
No 0.85     
Yes 0.15 10 0.01 
        
 Center for Social Development 
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5.  Institutional Characteristics, 
Participant Characteristics, and Net Deposits 
 
 
Average monthly net deposits (AMND) are defined as net deposits divided by months of 
participation.1 AMND is the key outcome measure in this report; greater AMND implies greater 
savings and asset accumulation in IDAs. 
 
This chapter addresses the links between AMND and the characteristics of institutions and 
participants.  The intent is to build knowledge that might guide attempts to fine-tune institutional 
designs and public policy. 
 
The key links between AMND and characteristics of programs and participants are: 
• Race/ethnicity was correlated with AMND.  Compared with Caucasians, AMND was lower 
for Native Americans and higher for “Other”. 
• More education and full-time employment were correlated with AMND.  
• Income and former or current receipt of public assistance were not correlated with AMND. 
• Having a checking account was correlated with a decrease in AMND.  
• Having insurance coverage was linked to higher AMND. 
• Deposit frequency was positively correlated with AMND. 
 
 
Analysis Strategy 
 
Given length of participation, AMND depends on deposits net of withdrawals.  In turn, net 
deposits depend on a host of factors.  The analysis strategy here is to control for many of these 
factors through multivariate regression.   
 
Some factors influence net deposits but are not influenced by net deposits.  For example, AMND 
does not affect age, but age may affect AMND.  Other factors both influence net deposits and are 
influenced by them.  For example, programs may adjust the hours of financial education in 
response to saving by participants, and participant saving may be affected by the hours of 
financial education.  Such two-way causation can bias estimates of associations between 
characteristics and AMND. 
 
Although the regression includes an unusually large number of controls (2 institutional 
characteristics and 32 participant characteristics), no regression can control for everything.2   
                                                 
1
 Net deposits are gross deposits minus total unmatched withdrawals. 
2
 Control variables were selected if they were expected to influence AMND, appeared in MIS 
IDA, and had sufficient variation.  With variables for missing data, for different attributes of a 
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Unobserved factors omitted from the model, if correlated with both observed factors in the 
model and with AMND, can impart a bias to the estimates for factors in the model.  When 
possible, we control for unobserved factors correlated with observed factors such as site, gender, 
race/ethnicity, or asset ownership.  For example, the estimated link between gender and AMND 
reflects not gender per se but rather unobserved factors linked with gender. 
 
 
Self-selection and non-exit.  All exits have zero AMND by definition; so unobserved factors 
that influence exit may also influence AMND.  Furthermore, the process that determines exit is 
probably distinct from the process that determines AMND, and it is probable that people with 
different likelihoods of exit (even if they have not exited as of March 31, 2001) also have 
systematically different levels of AMND. 
 
We model exit and take the difference between predicted exit status and observed exit status as a 
proxy for unobserved factors that may influence AMND.  This is the essence of the technique to 
control for self-selection known as the Heckman two-step (Heckman, 1976, 1979; Greene, 
1993).  The first step is a probit regression on exit status for all participants, and the second step 
is a least-squares regression on AMND for non-exits with a variable to control for unobserved 
factors correlated both with exit and with AMND.  Here, the Heckman two-step controls for self-
selection into exit.3 An advantage of the two-step model is that it allows a given characteristic to 
influence exit differently than it influences AMND. Chapter 4 reports the first step, and this 
chapter reports the second step. 
 
 
Model fit.  The second-step least-squares regression includes 410 observations on AMND for 
non-exits as of March 31, 2001.4 Adjusted R2 was 0.43, so variation in observed factors explains 
43 percent of the variation in AMND. For a cross-section savings regression, this is quite 
respectable. The hypothesis that the model as a whole is statistically insignificant is rejected with 
99-percent confidence.5  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
given characteristic, and for non-linear effects, 84 parameters were estimated.  Chapter 4 
discusses the controls for missing data. 
3
 The data from FAIM cannot address self-selection into participation.  That is, among people 
eligible for FAIM, those who chose to join probably expected greater net benefits than did those 
who did not choose to join.  Thus, AMND for participants probably exceeds what it would be for 
non-participants, had they joined.  The results here are still meaningful, but they pertain only to 
participants, not to eligibles. 
4
 Twenty-three non-exits were omitted due to missing values.  
5
 The correlation between prediction errors in the Heckman two-step is 0.02, and the p-value for 
the estimated coefficient on the Inverse Mills Ratio in the second step is 0.95.  For this 
specification, the risk of exit was not correlated with the expected level of AMND. 
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AMND for Non-exits 
 
Regression Results 
 
Regression estimates the sign (positive or negative), size, and statistical significance of 
associations between an outcome (AMND) and characteristics assumed to influence the 
outcome.  A regression estimate should approach the true association better than bivariate 
comparisons because regression controls for correlations with more than one characteristic. 
 
The regression tables contain the means of the characteristics in the model for non-exits, the 
estimated changes in AMND (in units of dollars of net deposits per month) given a unit increase 
in a given characteristic, and the p-value of the estimated change.6  Although the results are 
presented in 7 tables, they all come from one regression.   
 
 
Institutional Characteristics 
 
General Financial education.  All programs in FAIM require financial education.  None of the 
estimated associations between financial education and AMND was statistically significant.  As 
of March 31, 2001, however, 32% of FAIM participants had not attended any financial-education 
classes. 
 
Unobserved factors correlated with a given site.  Although the regression includes a wide 
range of characteristics, it cannot control for everything.  As a second-best response, it controls 
for possible links between AMND and unobserved factors correlated with a given site.  
Unobserved factors include program characteristics (such as the strictness of rule enforcement), 
participant characteristics (such as future orientation), and characteristics beyond programs or 
participants (such as the local economy). 
 
The estimate for Community Action of Minneapolis is set to zero and is the base of comparison.  
For example, compared with unobserved factors at Community Action of Minneapolis, 
unobserved factors at Clay-Wilkin Opportunity Council were associated with a statistically 
significant decrease in AMND of $7.00 (Table 5.1).  Many comparisons with Community Action 
of Minneapolis are likewise large and statistically significant.7 
 
These estimates suggest that unobserved factors correlated with AMND differ systematically 
across sites.  They are control variables, not tests for which program elicits the highest AMND.  
They do not mean that the Southwestern MN Opportunity Council (where  AMND is $8.20 less 
than at Community Action of Minneapolis, observed factors constant) causes its participants to 
have $12.50 less AMND than they would at the Ramsey Action Program (where AMND is $4.30 
more than at Community Action of Minneapolis).  The estimates do depend in part on 
unobserved program factors, but they also depend on unobserved participant factors and on 
                                                 
6
 Appendix A discusses mean, change in percentage points, and p-value. 
7
 We have not tested for the statistical significance of pair-wise comparisons with programs other 
than Community Action of Minneapolis. 
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unobserved factors beyond programs and participants.  We do not know the omitted factors, nor 
do we know how much each one matters. 
 
 
Table 5.1  Institutional Characteristics  
 AMND for Non-exits 
Independent Variable Mean  p-value 
    
Hours of general financial ed. 13.6   
None 0.27 -4.4 0.26 
1 to 6 5.8 -0.84 0.28 
7 to 12 4.4 0.37 0.34 
13 to 18 3.2 0.04 0.89 
 
   
Programs    
Community Development Federal Credit Union (8) 0.042 4.6 0.23 
Ramsey Action Programs (8) 0.065 4.3 0.04 
AEOA (1) 0.021 3.8 0.25 
Otter Tail -Wadena Community Action Council (5) 0.03 3 0.29 
KOOTASCA Community Action (1) 0.023 1.3 0.68 
Heartland Community Action (6) 0.035 1.2 0.68 
Tri-County Action Program (5) 0.069 0.25 0.91 
Women Venture (8) 0.055 0.1 0.96 
Community Action of Minneapolis (8) 0.09   
Community Action Program Duluth (1) 0.048 -0.37 0.87 
Minnesota Valley Action Council (7) 0.06 -0.7 0.79 
Leech Lake Tribe (3) 0.06 -1.2 0.75 
Olmsted Community Action Program (7) 0.009 -1.5 0.71 
Prairie Five Community Action Council (6) 0.009 -1.6 0.7 
Scott-Carver-Dakota CAP (8) 0.046 -2.4 0.33 
Freeborn Community Action (7) 0.014 -2.8 0.51 
Tri-Valley Opportunity Council (2) 0.018 -2.9 0.38 
Anoka County Community Action Program (8) 0.046 -3 0.25 
West Central MN CA (4) 0.048 -3.9 0.15 
Suburban Hennpin Community Action (8) 0.048 -4.6 0.05 
White Earth Tribe (3) 0.032 -5 0.25 
Bi-County CAP (2) 0.021 -5.7 0.07 
Northwest Community Action (2) 0.023 -6 0.12 
Western Community Action (6) 0.03 -6.1 0.03 
Clay-Wilkin Opportunity Council (4) 0.021 -7 0.05 
Inter-County Community Council (2) 0.021 -7.3 0.03 
Southwestern MN Opportunity Council (6) 0.014 -8.2 0.02 
      The FAIM Pilot Project geographic region is in parentheses. 
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Participant Demographics 
 
This section describes associations between AMND and participant demographics.  These factors 
are best seen as controls rather than as causes; they proxy for unobserved factors correlated with 
both participant demographics and AMND. 
 
Gender.  Gender is included as a control variable, not because we want to test whether there is a 
genetic predisposition to save in IDAs that differs between men and women, but because gender 
is correlated with unobserved factors produced in the social context that may be correlated with 
AMND.  Compared with males, females show a decrease in AMND of $1.70 (87-percent 
confidence, Table 5.2). 
 
Age.  Up to age 40, AMND increases by 16 cents for each year (94-percent confidence).  After 
40, age is not statistically significant (See Table 5.2). 
 
Location of residence.  Residence might affect AMND through transaction costs of deposits and 
withdrawals.  Residence, however, did not have a statistically significant link with AMND 
(Table 5.2). 
 
Marital status.  Marital status might proxy for unobserved factors that affect saving.  Marital 
status, however, had no statistically significant link with AMND (See Table 5.2). 
 
Number of adults and children.  Each additional adult was linked with a $1.60 decrease in 
AMND (93-percent confidence, Table 5.2).  One possible explanation might be that as the 
number of adults in the household increases, there are greater demands on resources and so it is 
more difficult to save.  The number of children did not have a statistically significant association 
with AMND.   
 
Race/ethnicity.  Like gender, we control for race/ethnicity because of its correlation with 
unobserved factors produced in the social context that may be correlated with AMND.  These 
differences are not due to race/ethnicity per se but rather to a constellation of socially produced 
characteristics correlated with both race/ethnicity and savings. 
 
Compared with Caucasians and holding all the other variables in the model constant, AMND 
was $7.00 less for Native Americans (99-percent confidence, Table 5.2) and $3.60 more for 
“Other” (98-percent confidence).  The difference in AMND between Caucasians and African-
Americans was not statistically significant.8   
 
                                                 
8
 We did not test statistical significance for pair-wise comparisons beyond Caucasians. 
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Table 5.2  Participant Demographics 
 
AMND for Non-exits 
Independent Variable Mean  p-value 
    
Gender    
Male 0.17   
Female 0.83 -1.7 0.13 
    
Age (spline) 36   
0 to 40 years  0.16 0.06 
40 years or more  0.10 0.34 
    
Location of residence    
Population 2,500 or more 0.65   
Population less than 2,500 0.35 -0.97 0.37 
    
Marital status    
Married 0.26 0.40 0.79 
Never-married 0.46   
Divorced, separated, or widowed 0.28 -0.18 0.86 
    
Household composition 3.3   
Adults (18 or older) 1.4 -1.6 0.07 
Children (17 or younger) 1.9 0.20 0.55 
    
Race/ethnicity    
African-American 0.14 -0.3 0.82 
Native American 0.12 -7.0 0.01 
Other 0.08 3.6 0.02 
Caucasian 0.67   
 
 
Education and Employment 
 
Education.  More education (and thus more human capital) might be linked with higher AMND 
either because education increases financial sophistication and future orientation and/or because 
education serves as a proxy for these unobserved factors. 
Compared to people who did not graduate from high school and holding all the other variables in 
the model constant, AMND was higher for people who graduated from high school.  People who 
completed high school or earned a GED were the highest savers, and they saved $4.60 more than 
people who did not graduate from high school (99-percent confidence, Table 5.3).   People who 
attended college but never graduated, and people who graduated from a 4-year college, saved 
$4.10 and $3.80 more than people who did not graduate from high school.  This implies 
differences of $2.50 to $4.60 a month, or between about 10-20% AMND. 
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Employment.  Because wages might be saved, the natural assumption would be that being 
employed might increase AMND.  Compared to the full-time employed, AMND was $3.00 
higher for the group including students, the unemployed, and those not working (98-percent 
confidence, Table 5.3).  We do not know why this group saves more than the employed group.  
One possible explanation is that the value of saving and gaining match money is more crucial to 
this group (students, the unemployed, and those not working) because this is an important source 
of resources right now.  
 
Public Assistance and Income 
 
As of March 31, 2001, mean monthly household income of participants in FAIM was $1,431 
(median $1,419, Table 5.4).  In annual terms, the mean is $17,172. 
 
Recurrent income (wages, government benefits, pensions, and investments) was 88 percent of 
total income and had a mean value of $1,267 (median $1,260, Table 5.4).  About 91 percent of 
participants received wages, and 26 percent received government benefits.  In terms of value, 76 
percent of income came from wages, and 12 percent came from government benefits.  
Intermittent income (self-employment, child support, gifts, and other sources) for participants in 
FAIM was 12 percent of total income and had a mean monthly value of $169 (Table 5.4). 
 
The typical participant is very close to the poverty line; the mean ratio of income to poverty was 
1.06 (median 1.03, Table 5.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3  Education and Employment Status 
 
AMND for Non-exits 
Independent Variable Mean  p-value 
    
Education    
Did not graduate from high school 0.07   
Completed high school or earned GED 0.20 4.6 0.01 
Attended college but did not graduate 0.41 4.1 0.02 
Graduated from 2-year college 0.10 2.5 0.22 
Graduated from 4-year college 0.23 3.8 0.04 
    
Employment    
Students, unemployed, and not working 0.13 3.0 0.02 
Employed, part-time (< 35 hours per week) 0.30 -0.70 0.46 
Employed, full-time (> 35 hours per week) 0.57   
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Table 5.4 Monthly Household Income of Participants by Source 
Income Source N 
Mean 
($) 
Median 
($) 
Min. 
($) Max. ($) Missing 
Participants 
 with an 
 Income 
 Source (%) 
Distribution 
 of Total 
Income by 
Source (%) 
Wages 513 1,124 1,181 0 3,000 0 91 76
Government Benefits 513 134 0 0 2,144 0 26 12
Pensions 513 4 0 0 965 0 1 0
Investments 501 3 0 0 750 12 1 0
    Recurrent Sources 499 1,267 1,260 0 3,000 14 96 88
         
Self-employment 513 87 0 0 3,167 0 13 6
Child Support 513 72 0 0 1,168 0 0 0
Gifts 513 3 0 0 475 0 1 0
Other Sources 512 6 0 0 1,080 1 1 0
    Intermittent Sources 510 169 0 0 3,167 3 34 12
         
Total Income 498 1,431 1,419 90 4,478 15 100 100
         
Income/Poverty 498 1.06 1.03 0.00 3.27 15  
 
 
Table 5.5  Public Assistance and Income 
 AMND for Non-exits 
Independent Variable Mean  p-value 
    
Receipt of public assistance    
TANF or AFDC never 0.38   
TANF or AFDC formerly 0.62 -0.15 0.87 
    
No TANF currently 0.89   
TANF currently 0.11 -1.9 0.22 
    
No SSI/SSDI 0.89   
Receives SSI/SSDI 0.11 -1.04 0.47 
    
No food stamps 0.83   
Receives food stamps 0.17 0.10 0.94 
    
Household income ($100/month)    
Recurrent income (spline) 12.7   
0 to $799  -0.23 0.37 
$800 or more  0.02 0.85 
    
Intermittent income 1.8 0.08 0.56 
Means taken over only non-missing observations. 
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Household income had no significant association with AMND.  In other words, income had little 
effect on savings behavior in FAIM (Table 5.5). 
 
Receipt of public assistance—whether TANF, AFDC, SSI/SSDI, or food stamps currently or 
before enrollment—had no statistically significant link to AMND (Table 5.5).   
 
 
Table 5.6  Distribution of Assets of Participants by Type 
Asset Type N 
Mean  
($) 
Median  
($) 
Min.  
($) 
Max.  
($) Missing 
Participants  
with an  
Asset Type  
(%) 
Distribution  
of Total  
Asset Value  
by Type  
(%) 
Passbook Account 503 217 0 0 5,000 10 49 8
Checking Account 508 253 80 0 4,500 5 75 12
    Total Liquid Assets 498 474 116 0 5,500 15 86 20
         
Home 510 12,974 0 0 170,000 3 25 20
Car 489 3,293 2,000 0 25,000 24 82 52
Business 509 771 0 0 90,000 4 7 2
Land or Property 512 292 0 0 30,000 1 3 1
Investments 507 523 0 0 30,000 6 19 5
    Total Illiquid Assets 477 17,363 3,000 0 178,500 36 85 80
         
Total Assets 466 17,342 3,378 0 178,560 47 96 100
Total Liabilities 242 15,980 4,685 0 175,000 271  
        Net Worth 233 657 10 -67,237 61,893 280  
 
 
Assets, Liabilities, and Insurance 
 
Median total assets for participants in FAIM were $3,378 (Table 5.6).  A few people had very 
high assets (one reported $178,560), so the mean ($17,342) exceeded the median. 
 
Liquid assets.  Balances at enrollment in passbook savings accounts or in checking accounts 
may proxy for financial sophistication, future orientation, or other unobserved factors linked with 
saving success.  Account balances may also be shifted into IDAs.  For these reasons, people who 
own an account when they start an IDA may be expected to save more. 
 
Median liquid assets in FAIM at enrollment were $116 (mean $474, Table 5.6).  About 49 
percent of participants had a passbook savings account (in addition to an IDA), and 75 percent 
had a checking account.9   
 
                                                 
9
 MIS IDA did not record the value of cash on-hand. 
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Ownership of a passbook savings account as well as the balance in the passbook account had no 
statistically significant link with AMND (Table 5.8).   
 
Owners of checking accounts can bounce checks, so checking accounts require greater financial 
sophistication than passbook savings accounts (Caskey, 2000).  Also, people with checking 
accounts can more easily make deposits by mail and avoid the transaction costs of a trip to the 
bank.  A checking account may thus proxy for unobserved characteristics—such as having saved 
in the past or not ending each month broke—linked with saving success.  Unexpectedly, 
ownership of a checking account was associated with a decrease in AMND of $2.20 (95-percent 
confidence, Table 5.8) and there was no statistically significant link with the checking account 
balance.   
 
Illiquid assets.  Other than human capital, houses and cars are the chief illiquid assets of the 
poor.  Like liquid assets, illiquid assets may proxy for unobserved factors correlated with higher 
saving.  Illiquid assets, however, are more difficult than liquid assets to shift into IDAs.10  
Illiquid assets had no statistically significant link with AMND (See Table 5.8). 
 
Liabilities.  Requirements for debt service mean that, all else constant, debtors have less 
resources available to save.  Median total liabilities in FAIM were $4,685 (Table 5.7).  A few 
people had very high debts (one reported $175,000), so the mean ($15,980) exceeded the 
median.  The average participant had home-mortgage debt of $8,047.  For the eighteen percent of 
the participants who had a home mortgage, average home-mortgage debt was $44,831.  In 
addition, the average participant had a car loan of $3,184.  For the 62 percent who had a car loan, 
the average car loan was $5,150.  (Table 5.7). 
                                                 
10
 Implicit shifts are still possible from resources that would have been used for maintenance or 
for additional investment in illiquid assets. 
Table 5.7 Distribution of Liabilities of Participants by Type 
Liability Type N 
Mean  
($) 
Median  
($) 
Min.  
($) 
Max.  
($) Missing 
Participants  
with a  
Liability  
Type (%) 
Distribution  
of Total  
Liability  
Value by  
Type (%) 
Home Mortgage 468 8,047 0 0 140,000 45 18 16 
Car Loan 275 3,184 1,500 0 20,000 238 62 40 
Business Loan 488 332 0 0 75,000 25 1 1 
Land or Property Mortgage 506 107 0 0 16,800 7 1 0 
Family and Friends Debt 511 712 0 0 63,000 2 21 6 
Household Bills 509 133 0 0 5,000 4 19 7 
Medical Bills 506 251 0 0 9,999 7 26 6 
Credit-card 508 701 0 0 13,000 5 32 11 
Student Loans 510 1,648 0 0 60,000 3 20 13 
    Total Liabilities 242 15,980 4,685 0 175,000 271 85 100 
         
Total Assets 466 17,342 3,378 0 178,560 47 96 
    Net Worth 233 657 10 -67,237 61,893 280  
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Did participants fund IDAs with debt?  The data in MIS IDA suggest that it was possible.  
Participants could borrow, and they had debts on which they could have slowed repayment. 
 
Both debt and the value of liabilities had no statistically significant association with AMND (See 
Table 5.8). 
 
 
Table 5.8  Assets, Liabilities, and Insurance 
 
AMND for Non-exits 
Independent Variable Mean  p-value 
    
Liquid assets    
No passbook savings account 0.48   
Owned passbook savings account 0.52 0.23 0.79 
    
Balance in passbook savings account ($100s) 2.32 -0.04 0.53 
    
No checking account 0.21   
Owned checking account 0.79 -2.2 0.05 
    
Balance in checking account ($100s) 2.77 -0.02 0.76 
    
Illiquid assets    
Renter 0.73   
Home owner 0.27 0.34 0.82 
    
No car 0.16   
Car owner 0.84 -1.9 0.18 
    
Value of illiquid assets ($100s) 181 0.000 0.83 
    
Liabilities    
No debt 0.61   
Some debt 0.39 0.29 0.88 
    
Value of liabilities ($100s) 167 0.0014 0.63 
    
Insurance coverage    
No health insurance 0.20   
Had health insurance 0.80 1.19 0.26 
    
No life insurance 0.58   
Had life insurance 0.42 1.8 0.03 
 Means taken over only non-missing observations. 
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Insurance coverage.  The presence of insurance may proxy for future orientation, financial 
sophistication, or other unobserved characteristics linked with higher saving.11 On the other 
hand, premiums (at least for life insurance) would reduce the amount of resources available to 
save.  Having health insurance (including coverage by Medicaid or Medicare) increased AMND 
by $1.19 (74-percent confidence) and having life insurance increased AMND by $1.80 (97-
percent confidence, Table 5.8). 
 
Enrollment Characteristics 
 
The regression includes some factors related to enrollment and to the length of participation.  
They are best seen as controls rather than causes. 
 
 
 
 
Previous relationship with the host organization.  The receipt of services from the host may 
proxy for unobserved factors that impede saving.  The presence of a previous relationship, 
however, had no statistically significant link with AMND (Table 5.9). 
 
Referred by a partner organization.  Like people with a previous relationship with the host, 
people referred by a partner organization have received some social services, and this may signal 
something about their unobserved characteristics.  The association between being referred and 
AMND was statistically insignificant (Table 5.9). 
 
Length of participation.  AMND is linked with the length of participation (Table 5.9); it  
decreases by $1.40 per month in the first six months (99-percent confidence).  In months 7 to 12, 
however, AMND increases by $0.72 per month (96-percent confidence); and in months 13 to 15, 
it decreases by $2.20 per month (99-percent confidence).  This is an unexpected result.  It is 
possible that in the beginning months people are still getting acclimated into the program. By the 
                                                 
11
 Some people—especially the poor—also save in the form of cash-value life insurance. 
Table 5.9  Enrollment Characteristics 
  AMND for Non-exits 
Independent Variable Mean  p-value 
Previous relationship with host org.       
No 0.52     
Yes 0.48 0.89 0.38 
        
Referred by partner organization       
No 0.86     
Yes 0.14 -0.20 0.87 
        
Length of participation (months) 10.7     
1 to 6  -1.40 0.01 
7 to 12  0.72 0.04 
13 to 15  -2.2 0.01 
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seventh month, they are beginning to see the results of their efforts and they have higher 
opportunity cost of losing the match.  Moreover, by this month participants found ways to come 
up with IDA deposits from new savings, from increased time and effort in household production, 
or from reduced consumption.  We do not know why the AMND decreases in months 13 through 
15.  There are several possible explanations.  First, as time passes, participants may get tired, and 
new savings may shrink. Second, new participants may shift some assets from cash, checking 
accounts, and passbook savings accounts into IDAs.  In time, however, liquid assets to shift may 
dwindle.  Third, participants may be more motivated at first as they learn about IDAs and attend 
classes.  As the newness wears off, the spark may ebb.  Furthermore, IDA staff may spend more 
time on new participants.  Fourth, it is likely that some participants enroll at a high point in their 
financial lives (for example, after they receive a tax refund or an EITC payment).  With time, 
deposits fall off as inflows regress to a more average state. 
 
 
         Means taken over only non-missing observations. 
 
 
Characteristics Determined after Enrollment 
 
The regression controls for several factors determined after enrollment.  Although they may 
affect saving, saving may also affect them.  They are more controls than causes. 
 
Direct deposit.  The estimated association between direct deposit and AMND was not 
statistically significant (Table 5.10). 
 
Deposit frequency.  Deposit frequency is defined as the number of months with a deposit 
divided by the number of months of participation.  We suspect that high saving causes frequent 
saving, in part because making a deposit has transaction costs and because high savers are more 
likely in more months to have deposits large enough to make these costs worthwhile.  We also 
suspect that frequent saving causes high saving.  In months when saving is more difficult, the 
person who wants to be a frequent depositor is more likely than otherwise to make a greater 
effort.  In the long term, people who set a savings target and then consume the residual are 
likely—because they will make a greater effort to save in difficult months—to save more than 
Independent Variable Mean  p-value
Use of direct deposit to IDA account
No 0.83
Yes 0.17 -0.08 0.95
Deposit frequency
Share of months with a deposit 0.78 22 0.01
Planned or actual use of matched withdrawal
Microenterprise 0.23 -0.39 0.72
Post-secondary ed. 0.16 0.1 0.95
Home purchase 0.62
AMND for Non-exits
Table 5.10  Characteristics Determined after Enrollment
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people who set a consumption target and then save the residual.  Furthermore, frequent deposits 
may be a pre-commitment device that puts cash out of reach. 
 
A unit increase in deposit frequency was associated with a $22 increase in AMND (99-percent 
confidence, Table 5.10).  The measure of deposit frequency, however, ranges between zero (no 
deposits) and unity (a deposit each month), so a unit change is not relevant.  Compared to 
someone with deposit frequency in the 25th percentile (53 percent), predicted AMND for 
someone in the 75th percentile (100 percent) would be about $10.34 higher.  This is a large 
effect, although we cannot untangle each side of the two-way causation.   
 
Planned or actual use of matched withdrawals.  People who plan to save to buy a house may 
save more, all-else constant, than people who plan to save for post-secondary education.  Thus, 
planned use may affect saving.  Also, some participants enroll without a clear goal for their 
matched use.  If they find that they save a lot, then they may make a larger purchase; if they save 
less, then they may make a smaller purchase.  Thus, saving affects actual use.  In FAIM, AMND 
had no statistically significant association with any uses (See Table 5.10). 
Center for Social Development 
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6.  Conclusions 
 
 
FAIM is the first statewide IDA program to be studied in this level of detail.  This report will 
likely be of interest not only within Minnesota, but also in other states that are operating or 
planning to operate a statewide IDA program.  Every state will be somewhat distinctive, but 
findings and lessons from FAIM are likely to be informative for other state IDA programs.         
 
The FAIM Population 
 
Participants in FAIM are both program-selected (eligibility criteria) and self-selected (voluntary 
participation).  It seems likely that program selection is very important.  An important policy 
question is who would enroll in IDAs if all low-income people were eligible?  Unfortunately, the 
data from FAIM cannot answer this question. 
 
Before drawing conclusions, it is important to ask whether participants in FAIM are like others at 
or below 200 percent of the poverty line.1  Compared to the U.S. low-income population, FAIM 
participants are better educated, more likely to be employed, and more likely to have a bank 
account.  This pattern reflects the explicit targeting of IDA programs in FAIM to the “working 
poor.”  Participants in FAIM are also more likely to be female and to be never–married.  This 
pattern reflects the types of clients served by the organizations that are running IDA programs in 
FAIM.  Thus, compared to others with similar incomes, FAIM participants are more likely to be 
disadvantaged in terms of gender and marital status, but less likely to be disadvantaged in terms 
of education, employment status, and the use of banks.   
 
We can say that at least some poor people with the characteristics of participants in FAIM are 
able to save in IDA programs.  This does not mean that poor people with different characteristics 
can or cannot save.  As yet, we do not know much about that.            
 
Key Findings on Saving Performance and Asset Acquisition 
 
Early research results from FAIM, based on data from MIS IDA, show that the poor can save in 
IDAs.  In 27 IDA sites, 513 participants saved an average of about $25 per month, and saved an 
average of 85 percent of the monthly savings target.  The typical participant made deposits in 9 
of 12 months.  Given that the match was 3:1, the average participant accumulated resources 
worth about $100 per month, or $1,200 per year, through IDAs.  
 
Is this a meaningful amount of asset accumulation?  FAIM participants are not economically 
advantaged or wealthy.  For example, about 64 percent of FAIM participants were or had been a 
“welfare” recipient (AFDC or TANF), and about 75 percent did not own a home.  Regarding 
financial assets, the median passbook saving balance was $0, and the median checking account 
balance was $80.  The median net worth (assets minus liabilities) of FAIM participants was $10.  
                                                 
1
 FAIM used EITC guidelines to determine eligibility.  For comparison to FAIM participants, however, this 
information is based on 200% of poverty. 
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Thus, average accumulation of $1,200 per year in IDAs represents a large sum of financial assets 
for the typical FAIM participant. 
 
The exit (dropout) rate for FAIM was 16 percent and will assuredly increase.  Is this high or 
low?  We cannot say.  However, it would be unrealistic to expect 100 percent success.  In many 
types of programs serving poor people, a success rate of even 50 percent would be considered 
good.     
 
About 63 percent of FAIM participants say they are saving for home purchase, 22 percent to 
capitalize a small business, and 15 percent for post-secondary education.  Therefore, it appears as 
if the largest category of asset purchase will be home ownership.  Many of these families did not 
think it was possible for them to own a home before their participation in FAIM.  
 
Results from FAIM with Some Comparisons to the American Dream Demonstration 
 
The first major study of IDAs has been of the American Dream Demonstration (ADD).  ADD is 
a demonstration of IDAs in 14 programs across the United States.  As of June 30, 2000, ADD 
had 2,378 participants.  Participants in ADD had similar demographic characteristics as the 
participants in FAIM.  In both FAIM and ADD, participants were mostly female, never–married, 
and had high levels of education and employment compared to the U.S. low-income population.  
Participants in FAIM, however, may be somewhat wealthier than ADD participants.  In FAIM, a 
greater share of participants had a checking account, owned a house, owned a car, and/or were 
covered by health insurance. 
 
Comparison of saving outcomes in FAIM and ADD reveal that AMND was similar for both, 
about $25 per month.  The programs set monthly saving targets for participants, often $25 or $30 
per month, and very likely many participants try to reach those targets.  This is due to both an 
economic effect (trying to save the amount of money that is matchable) and to a social effect 
(trying to meet expectations of program staff and peers).      
 
On average, participants in ADD had a lower deposit frequency (7 of 12 months) than in FAIM 
(9 of 12 months).  Based on our knowledge of both FAIM and ADD, we believe that more 
program emphasis was placed on regular saving in FAIM than in ADD. 
 
Also, participants in ADD has a higher rate of unmatched withdrawals compared to participants 
in FAIM.  About 37 percent of participants in ADD made unmatched withdrawals, compared to 
20 percent of participants in FAIM.  In part, these differences may be explained by the longer 
period of participation in ADD, an average of 13.8 months as opposed to 10.2 months in FAIM.  
Even so, FAIM is on a trajectory to have a much smaller share of drop-outs than ADD.  The 
unmatched withdrawal rate can be expected to increase in both ADD and FAIM as time goes on 
(by definition it cannot decrease after everyone is enrolled).  Why are unmatched withdrawals 
important?  Because at least some of the money will not be re-deposited and participants will 
lose out on the matching funds.  The fact that the percentage of unmatched withdrawals is high 
underscores that long-term saving is difficult for people of low income.  This pattern also 
suggests that at least some IDA participants may be using their accounts for short-term saving, 
perhaps even as transaction accounts.  If this were the case, it would be preferable to open a 
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second account (either saving or checking) that is for short-term deposits and withdrawals.  One 
lesson that we are learning from research on IDAs is that the poor as well as the rich can benefit 
from different kinds of financial instruments for different purposes.  
 
Institutional Characteristics 
 
In terms of institutional characteristics, the most important findings were in unobserved program 
differences among the sites.  In other words, IDA programs were associated with variables that 
were not being measured that were also associated with saving performance of participants (as 
measured by AMND).  This could be anything from variations in enthusiasm of staff to regional 
differences in transportation difficulty.  More research is needed to specify and measure program 
factors that may be associated with saving differences. 
 
That said, it is important to note that participants were saving successfully in every IDA program 
site in FAIM.  In terms of saving amount, there is no program in FAIM, or in ADD for that 
matter that could be considered a failure.           
 
In FAIM, we found no statistical association between hours of financial education and saving 
performance.   This differs from ADD, where we found that more financial education (up to 12 
hours) was associated with increased saving.  We cannot explain these different findings, though 
we suspect rather large measurement error in the content of “financial education” from one 
program site to another.     
 
In both FAIM and ADD, participants are less likely to drop out of an IDA program if they used 
direct deposit.  However, direct deposit in FAIM and ADD was not associated with higher 
saving amounts.   
 
Participant Characteristics 
 
In FAIM, males saved $1.70 per month more than females.  Those over age 40 save $0.16 per 
month more than those under age 40.  Marital status was not statistically associated with saving 
amount.  Each additional adult was associated with $1.60 less in monthly saving, but the number 
of children was not statistically related to saving.   
 
In terms of race/ethnicity, African-Americans in FAIM saved statistically the same as 
Caucasians.  However, Native Americans saved $7.00 per month less than Caucasians.  This 
latter finding raises questions about how IDA programs in FAIM are responding to the 
circumstances of Native Americans.  Nonetheless, it is important to note that Native Americans 
were saving, and this too has to be considered a success. 
 
People who did not graduate from high school saved less than other education groups, with the 
difference ranging from $2.50 to $4.60 per month.  This finding might be expected. 
 
Turning to employment, a group that includes students, the unemployed, and those not working 
saved statistically about $3.00 per month more than the full-time employed.  We do not know 
why. 
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Receipt of public TANF or AFDC, currently or before enrollment, was not associated with 
savings performance in FAIM.  In other words, in these research results there is no basis for 
concluding that welfare recipients cannot save as well as others.    
 
As we found in ADD, income had no statistical association with savings amount in FAIM.  
Controlling for other factors, those with low income saved as much as those with higher income.  
This means that those with lower income saved a greater share of their income (AMND/monthly 
income).  Also similar to ADD findings, the risk of exit was not associated with the level of 
income in FAIM.  Our interpretation is that the institutional characteristics of IDA programs 
(program rules, matching deposits, financial education, involvement of staff, etc.) may be 
stronger than participant income in determining saving performance. 
 
The fact that findings are largely similar in FAIM and ADD is somewhat hopeful in that it 
suggests that the IDA experience may be similar across different program designs and population 
groups.  If this continues to be the case in other states, the findings might be the basis for 
improved IDA policy and programs.  For example, if certain participant characteristics are 
associated with reduced saving performance, then policy and programs might target those 
participants with additional staff attention and/or other supports. 
 
Toward the Future 
 
This report is based on data from FAIM in its preliminary stages.  Data were collected 15 months 
after the program began.  Additional data from the remaining months in FAIM will shed more 
light on saving patterns and performance. 
 
As mentioned in the preface, state policy is increasingly important as the federal government 
returns more authority, especially for anti-poverty policy, to the states.  FAIM and other 
programs at the state level are the ground upon which IDA policy and programs will be nurtured 
and improved, and later transplanted to other states.  We anticipate that cumulative state-level 
knowledge about IDAs, at some point in the future, will influence a larger federal policy for 
progressive savings. 
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Data and MIS IDA 
 
 
This appendix discusses the data and methods used to analyze saving behavior in FAIM.  The 
goal is to help readers to make informed judgements about how best to use the results. 
 
Data 
 
MIS IDA 
 
Program staff collects data for this evaluation with the Management Information System for 
Individual Development Accounts (MIS IDA).  MIS IDA also helps programs to manage the 
logistics of IDAs.  CSD anticipated the need for MIS IDA, designed and wrote the software, and 
now distributes and supports it. 
 
MIS IDA provides management tools such as account statements, mailings, and more than 30 
reports.  It also generates a comprehensive database on program characteristics, on participant 
characteristics, and on enrollments, deposits, and withdrawals.  Moreover, with MIS IDA in 
place, an IDA program can track its own performance, and the database facilitates external 
evaluation.  MIS IDA is used in 41 states, the District of Columbia, and Canada. 
 
CSD identified the need for a management-information system in 1995.  In 1996, CSD put 
together a national team to identify the types of data that such a system should collect.  Version 
1.0 of MIS IDA was released in mid-1997, and Version 2.0 was released in 1998.  Version 3.0, 
released in January 2000, was used to collect the data in this report.  Table 1 lists selected fields 
collected in MIS IDA Version 3.0. 
 
IDA staff record four types of data in MIS IDA: account-structure parameters at the start of the 
program, socio-economic data on participants at enrollment, monthly cash-flow data from 
account statements, and intermittent events such as class attendance and exit. 
 
Data Quality   
 
CSD also developed a complementary software program—MIS IDA QC—as a quality-control 
tool for researchers and IDA programs to check the accuracy of data in MIS IDA.  To ensure 
clean data, CSD and the FAIM Fiscal Agent ran MIS IDA QC reports and cross-checked for 
data-entry errors, missing values, and accounting inconsistencies.  Programs were asked to 
correct missing or inconsistent data.  This extensive process significantly improves the quality of 
data. 
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Table 1.  Selected Data Collected in MIS IDA Version 3.0 
 
Characteristics of Programs 
• Age of host organization 
• Type of financial institution(s) 
 
Funding Partners of Programs 
• Type of organization 
• Matchable uses 
• Starting and ending dates of partnership 
• Amount and type of contribution 
 
Account Structure for Programs 
• Frequency of account statements 
• Number of signatures required for withdrawals 
• Penalties for unmatched withdrawals 
• Matchable uses 
• Wait period(s) 
Financial Education 
• Hours of general financial education offered and required 
by a program 
• Hours of asset-specific education required by a program 
• Hours of general financial education attended by a 
participant 
• Hours and types of asset-specific education attended by a 
participant 
Enrollment of Participants 
• Social Security number 
• Name and address 
• Name and address of relative 
• Enrollment date 
• Date of exit 
• Reason for exit 
• Previous relationship with host organization 
• Referral from partner organization 
 
Demographics of Participants 
• Gender 
• Year of birth 
• Urban/rural residence 
• Marital status 
• Number of adults in household 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demographics of Participants continued 
• Number of children in household 
• Race/Ethnicity 
• Education status 
• Employment status 
 
Income and Public Assistance of Participants 
• Monthly gross income (wages, government benefits, 
pensions, investments, self-employment, child support, 
gifts, and other) 
• Former TANF or AFDC status  
• Current TANF status 
• Current food-stamp status 
• Current SSI/SSDI status 
 
Assets, Liabilities, and Insurance of Participants 
• Assets (passbook savings, checking, home, car, business, 
land or property, investments) 
• Liabilities (home, car, business, land or property, family 
or friends, household bills, medical bills, credit cards, 
student loans) 
• Insurance (health, life) 
 
Account Data for Participants 
• Number of bank account 
• Name of financial institution 
• Date account opened and date closed 
• Funding partner(s) 
• Use of direct deposit 
• Type of match-cap structure 
• Annual match cap 
• Lifetime match cap 
• Match rate 
• Time cap 
 
Periodic Deposits and Withdrawals by Participants 
• Starting and ending balance 
• Number and amount of deposits 
• Number and amount of withdrawals 
• Amount of service fees 
• Amount of interest 
 
Matched Withdrawals by Participants 
• Use of withdrawal 
• Vendor name and address 
• Withdrawal date 
• Amount withdrawn 
• Amount of match 
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The cash-flow data from MIS IDA are probably the best data that exist on high-frequency saving 
behavior by the poor in any subsidized-savings program.  This report centers on this data.   
 
Data Caveats 
 
The staff members of IDA programs are not full-time researchers, and, despite their consistent 
commitment to accurate data and their strong support for the evaluation as a whole, quality 
varies among programs and among types of data.  Most time-constant demographic variables are 
accurate.  However, we cannot check whether program staff recorded all intermittent events such 
as exit and financial education.   
 
As in all surveys, data on income, assets, and liabilities are measured with error.  Participants 
often do not know these values, especially for non-financial assets such as homes or cars.  MIS 
IDA asked for income at the household level but for assets at the individual level, and we do not 
know how participants reported jointly owned assets.  Some people may have understated 
income or assets in the belief that this would increase their chances of acceptance into the means-
tested program. 

Account-structure parameters in MIS IDA may not always match the rules used in the field.  
This might result from staff turnover, because programs did not think much about some aspects 
of account structure (such as the time cap) until after they started, and/or because programs 
changed the structure of accounts but did not record the change in MIS IDA.  In this 
demonstration, the core program rules are dictated by the FAIM Pilot Project Policies and 
Procedures Manual (2001). 
 
Definitions 
 
Mean.  The mean is the average.  For categorical variables (for example, gender, marital status), 
each category is represented by one variable that will take a value of zero (if the participant is not 
female) or one (if the participant is female).  Thus, the mean is the share of the characteristics 
that takes the given value.  For example 17% of participants are male, and 83% female (see 
Table 5.2). 
 
Statistical significance and the p-value.  This report discusses the precision of estimates of 
links between savings outcomes and the characteristics of participants and programs in terms of 
statistical significance.  Results are statistically significant if they are not likely due to sampling 
variation.  Larger sample sizes boost statistical significance, the confidence that an estimated 
relationship is “real” and does not merely reflect an unusual sample due to chance. 
 
For example, suppose that we want to test a coin for fairness (a fair coin lands on “heads” half 
the time).  For 100 tosses of a fair coin, we would expect about 50 “heads.”   Even for a fair coin, 
however, we would not be surprised if, because of luck, we got 60 or more “heads.”   But luck 
should even out with more tosses.  If we tossed the coin 1,000 times and had 600 or more 
“heads,” then we might wonder whether the coin is really fair.  If 1,000,000 tosses produce 
600,000 or more “heads,” then we would strongly suspect a rigged coin. 
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The result of 60 or more “heads” in 100 tosses may not be statistically significant; it could 
happen even with a fair coin.  The result of 600 or more “heads” in 1,000 tosses is more 
statistically significant; it is unlikely with a fair coin.  The result of 600,000 or more “heads” in 
1,000,000 tosses is highly statistically significant; it would almost never happen with a fair coin. 
 
Statistical significance is expressed as a degree of confidence.  For example, suppose that many 
people toss fair coins 100 times and that 75 percent of them get 59 or fewer “heads.”   If we then 
toss a coin of unknown fairness 100 times and get 60 “heads,” we can have 75-percent 
confidence that it is not a fair coin. 
  
The p-value is the complement of the confidence level, expressed as a probability rather than as a 
percentage.  For example, 75-percent confidence implies a p-value of 0.25.  If the confidence 
level is x percent, then the p-value is (100–x)÷100.  The higher the confidence, the lower the p-
value. 
 
Statistical significance depends on both the real relationship and the sample size.  With small 
samples, statistical significance is rare, even if the real relationship is strong.  With large 
samples, statistical significance is common, even if the real relationship is weak.  Policy should 
look at both statistical significance and at the size of the estimated association. 
 
Of course, statistical significance implies only association, not causality.  Furthermore, statistical 
significance does not imply policy significance, and statistical insignificance does not imply 
policy insignificance.  For example, a statistically insignificant link between the match rate and 
exit might usefully imply that low matches are just as good as high ones. 
  
Finally, statistical significance measures imprecision due to sampling variation; it ignores all 
other sources of imprecision (such as measurement error).  For example, a model may assume 
that AMND depends only on gender, even though it really depends on a host of other factors but 
not on gender.  If gender is correlated with the other factors, however, then the model might find 
a large, statistically significant (but incorrect) link between AMND and gender. 
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predicted risk of non-exit given a unit change in an independent variable (one percentage point is 
1/100, or 0.01).1  If the estimated change linked to a unit increase in an independent variable is 
positive, then the likelihood of non-exit increases (decreases in the likelihood of exit).  Negative 
estimates imply decreases in the likelihood of non-exit (increases in the likelihood of exit).  For 
	  
	  %” in Table 4.7 shows the change in the likelihood of non-exit for 
participants with direct deposit relative to the likelihood of participants without direct deposit.  
As shown, having direct deposit was associated with a 10-percentage-point increase—compared 
to not having a direct deposit—in the likelihood of non-exit (99-percent confidence).   
 
                                                 
1
 The percentage-point changes are computed at the means of the independent variables. 
Standard errors are computed with the delta method (Greene, 1993). 
 Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
Appendix B 
Results by Region 
 
Participant Characteristics and Savings Patterns at Each FAIM IDA Region 
 
In this appendix we summarize participant characteristics and savings patterns for each of the 
FAIM IDA programs separately.  These are not intended so that one program should be 
compared against each others.  Such comparisons would not be very informative because each 
IDA program is dealing with a different population, and different program sizes.  The patterns of 
individual characteristics and savings patterns are nonetheless informative in describing 
particular circumstances and patterns of saving at the different sites. 
 
As of March 31, 2001, 513 participants were enrolled in the eight regions of FAIM.  The average 
monthly net deposit (AMND)—defined as net deposits divided by months of participation—
varied from a low of $15.24 to a high of $30.21.  Among the eight regions, the mean deposit 
frequency ranged between 5.8 of every 12 months and 10.6 of every 12 months.  Gross deposits 
per month in all months were between $16.22 and $32.12.  Excluding months without deposits, 
gross deposits per month were $33.76 and $40.91. 
 
 
The 8 IDA Regions 
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Northland Foundation Regional Cluster 
AEO, Community Action Program Duluth, KOOTASCA Community Action 
 
Participant Characteristics (N = 51) 
           Gender %
Female 84
Male 16
Population 2,500 or more 76
Population less than 2,500 24
African-American 2
Asian-American or Pacific Islander 2
Caucasian 82
Hispanic 8
Native American 4
Other 2
13 to 19 0
20s 33
30s 35
40s 25
50s 6
60 to 72 0
Missing 0
Household Composition
Never Married 61
Married 16
Divorced or Separated 24
Widowed 0
One Adult with Children 53
One Adult without Children 24
Two or more Adults with Children 24
Two or more Adults w/o Children 0
1 76
2 22
3 0
4 2
5 or more 0
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Demographics
Marital Status
Household Type
Adults in Household
0 24
1 25
2 25
3 14
4 12
5 or more 0
Education and Employment
Did not Complete High School 6
Completed High School or GED 14
Attended College 51
Completed 2-year Degree 14
Completed 4-year Degree or more 16
Employed Full-time 49
Employed Part-time 35
Unemployed 0
Not Working 2
Student, not Working 2
Student, also Working 12
Yes 12
No 88
Financial
0 to 49 16
50 to 74 12
75 to 99 22
100 to 124 14
125 to 149 20
150 to 174 10
175 to 199 2
200 to 686 4
Missing 2
Never 37
Formerly 63
Currently 8
Children in Household
Education
Employment
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (%)
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Yes 33
No 67
Missing 0
Yes 22
No 78
Missing 0
Yes 80
No 20
Missing 0
Yes 31
No 69
Missing 0
Home Purchase 59
Self-employment 18
Post-secondary Education 24
Yes 39
No 61
Missing 0
Yes 16
No 84
Missing 0
Yes 24
No 76
Missing 0
Passbook Savings Account 61
Checking 84
Both 49
Either 96
Zero 29
1 to 6 8
7 to 12 4
13 to 18 43
Missing 16
Received Food Stamps
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Direct Deposit to IDA Account
Bank Account
Hours of General Financial Education 
Attended
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of Matched 
Withdrawal
Previous Relationship with Host 
Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
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Income, Assets and Liabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 50 301 4 0 4,000 1 100 10
Checking Account 51 149 50 0 1,500 0 84 8
    Total Liquid Assets 50 453 103 0 4,200 1 96 18
Home 51 6,275 0 0 76,000 0 12 11
Car 50 3,568 1,900 0 17,000 1 90 63
Business 50 70 0 0 1,500 1 8 3
Land or Property 51 329 0 0 16,800 0 2 2
Investments 51 638 0 0 30,000 0 12 3
    Total Illiquid Assets 49 11,209 3,000 0 85,288 2 92 82
Total Assets 49 11,609 3,145 3 85,338 2 100 100
Total Liabilities 24 9,044 5,070 0 58,000 27
        Net Worth 24 -541 -22 -15,523 32,607 27
Assets of Participants for Northland Foundation Regional Cluster
Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
% of 
Participants 
with a Source of 
Income
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 51 1,026 1,050 0 2,383 0 92 72
Government Benefits 51 158 0 0 1,024 0 35 15
Pensions 51 19 0 0 965 0 2 1
Investments 50 0 0 0 8 1 2 0
    Recurrent Sources 50 1,209 1,200 0 2,383 1 96 88
Self-employment 51 40 0 0 800 0 12 6
Child Support 51 94 0 0 1,012 0 0 0
Gifts 51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Sources 51 21 0 0 1,080 0 2 1
    Intermittent Sources 51 156 0 0 1,080 0 31 12
Total Income 50 1,367 1,289 260 2,980 1 100 100
Income/Poverty 50 1.04 1.00 0.00 2.34 1
Income for Participants for Northland
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Enrollment, Deposits and Withdrawals 
 
As of March 31, 2001, 51 participants were enrolled in Northland Foundation Regional Cluster.  The 
average monthly net deposit (AMND)—defined as net deposits divided by months of participation—
was $28.83, and 2 percent of participants (one participant) had made matched withdrawals.  About 24 
percent of participants had made unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances. 
 
The average length of participation was 9.3 months, and the average number of months per year with a 
deposit was 9.7 (deposit frequency was 81 percent).  Gross deposits per month in all months were 
$32.12.  Excluding months without deposits, gross deposits per month were $39.86. 
 
 
Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Liability 
Value by Type 
(%)
Home Mortgage 50 4,400 0 0 58,000 1 10 5
Car Loan 26 3,909 1,250 0 17,000 25 73 53
Business Loan 48 31 0 0 1,500 3 2 3
Land or Property Mortgage 51 329 0 0 16,800 0 2 0
Family and Friends Debt 51 687 0 0 15,000 0 14 1
Household Bills 51 33 0 0 350 0 14 0
Medical Bills 51 99 0 0 2,100 0 16 2
Credit-card 51 428 0 0 5,900 0 27 14
Student Loans 51 1,597 0 0 20,328 0 22 23
    Total Liabilities 24 9,044 5,070 0 58,000 27 88 100
Total Assets 49 11,609 3,145 3 85,338 2 100
    Net Worth 24 -541 -22 -15,523 32,607 27
Liabilities of Participants for Northland
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 15,355
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 1,690
Total unmatched withdrawals (1,690)      
Net deposits 13,665 40,995 54,660
    Matchable balances 13,485 40,454 53,939
    Matched withdrawals 180 541 721
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative Dollars) for 
Northland Foundation Regional Cluster
 Center for Social Development 
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Bi-County CAP, Tri Valley Opportunity Council,  
Inter-County Community Council, Northwest Community Action 
 
Participant Characteristics (N = 39) 
 
Demographics
           Gender %
Female 79
Male 21
Population 2,500 or more 36
Population less than 2,500 64
African-American 0
Asian-American or Pacific Islander 0
Caucasian 97
Hispanic 0
Native American 0
Other 3
13 to 19 3
20s 15
30s 41
40s 41
50s 0
60 to 72 0
Missing 0
Household Composition
Never Married 21
Married 41
Divorced or Separated 36
Widowed 3
One Adult with Children 46
One Adult without Children 3
Two or more Adults with Children 46
Two or more Adults w/o Children 5
1 49
2 46
3 5
4 0
5 or more 0
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Marital Status
Household Type
Adults in Household
0 8
1 36
2 26
3 21
4 8
5 or more 3
Education and Employment
Did not Complete High School 5
Completed High School or GED 28
Attended College 46
Completed 2-year Degree 5
Completed 4-year Degree or more 15
Employed Full-time 59
Employed Part-time 31
Unemployed 0
Not Working 3
Student, not Working 3
Student, also Working 5
Yes 23
No 77
Financial
0 to 49 13
50 to 74 13
75 to 99 13
100 to 124 21
125 to 149 10
150 to 174 15
175 to 199 3
200 to 686 0
Missing 13
Never 31
Formerly 69
Currently 13
Yes 13
No 87
Missing 0
Children in Household
Education
Employment
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (%)
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Yes 5
No 95
Missing 0
Yes 82
No 18
Missing 0
Yes 67
No 33
Missing 0
Home Purchase 28
Self-employment 36
Post-secondary Education 36
Yes 69
No 26
Missing 5
Yes 8
No 90
Missing 3
Yes 28
No 72
Missing 0
Passbook Savings Account 33
Checking 87
Both 28
Either 92
Zero 28
1 to 6 10
7 to 12 21
13 to 18 41
Missing 0
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Direct Deposit to IDA Account
Bank Account
Hours of General Financial Education 
Attended
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of Matched 
Withdrawal
Previous Relationship with Host 
Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
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Income, Assets and Liabilities 
 
 
 
 
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 38 171 0 0 5,000 1 32 0
Checking Account 38 187 100 0 3,200 1 87 8
    Total Liquid Assets 37 360 100 0 5,500 2 92 8
Home 39 20,305 9,000 0 90,000 0 62 43
Car 35 3,894 2,500 0 21,000 4 89 39
Business 39 1,846 0 0 50,000 0 8 1
Land or Property 39 1,379 0 0 30,000 0 13 3
Investments 37 772 0 0 8,000 2 22 5
    Total Illiquid Assets 33 26,928 13,900 0 130,000 6 91 92
Total Assets 32 26,763 12,265 0 130,150 7 97 100
Total Liabilities 13 36,846 31,274 0 114,620 26
        Net Worth 12 4,336 1,250 -23,385 34,283 27
Assets of Participants for Northwest Minnesota Foundation Regional Cluster
Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Income 
Source (%)
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 39 1,076 1,200 0 2,639 0 92 74
Government Benefits 39 101 0 0 1,566 0 21 10
Pensions 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Investments 35 21 0 0 750 4 3 3
    Recurrent Sources 34 1,239 1,288 0 2,639 5 97 87
Self-employment 39 66 0 0 1,100 0 15 3
Child Support 39 92 0 0 541 0 0 0
Gifts 39 12 0 0 475 0 3 2
Other Sources 39 5 0 0 200 0 3 0
    Intermittent Sources 38 181 0 0 1,469 1 45 13
Total Income 34 1,409 1,422 481 2,800 5 100 100
Income/Poverty 34 1.01 1.04 0.00 1.81 5
Income for Participants for Northwest
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Enrollment, Deposits and Withdrawals 
 
As of March 31, 2001, 39 participants were enrolled in the Northwest Minnesota 
Foundation Regional Cluster.  The average monthly net deposit (AMND)—defined as net 
deposits divided by months of participation—was $25.46, and 3 percent of participants 
(one participant) had made matched withdrawals.  About 28 percent of participants had 
made unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances. 
 
The average length of participation was 11.6 months, and the average number of months 
per year with a deposit was 9.4 (deposit frequency was 81 percent).  Gross deposits per 
month in all months were $27.95.  Excluding months without deposits, gross deposits per 
month were $35.78. 
 
Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Liability 
Value by Type 
(%)
Home Mortgage 30 20,394 1,500 0 86,317 9 50 48
Car Loan 18 4,121 3,284 0 20,000 21 61 18
Business Loan 37 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
Land or Property Mortgage 37 338 0 0 6,500 2 5 1
Family and Friends Debt 39 484 0 0 14,500 0 18 9
Household Bills 39 158 0 0 2,000 0 26 1
Medical Bills 37 500 0 0 6,000 2 38 13
Credit-card 39 1,367 0 0 12,000 0 33 2
Student Loans 39 2,174 0 0 23,000 0 26 10
    Total Liabilities 13 36,846 31,274 0 114,620 26 92 100
Total Assets 32 26,763 12,265 0 130,150 7 97
    Net Worth 12 4,336 1,250 -23,385 34,283 27
Liabilities of Participants for Northwest
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 12,672
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 1,162
Total unmatched withdrawals (6,138)    
Net deposits 11,510 34,530 46,040
    Matchable balances 11,270 33,810 45,080
    Matched withdrawals 240 720 960
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative Dollars) for Northwest 
Minnesota Foundation Regional Cluster
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Minnesota Tribes 
Leech Lake Tribe, White Earth Tribe 
 
Participant Characteristics (N = 44) 
Income, Assets and Liabilities 
 
           Gender %
Female 68
Male 32
Population 2,500 or more 7
Population less than 2,500 93
African-American 0
Asian-American or Pacific Islander 0
Caucasian 0
Hispanic 0
Native American 100
Other 0
13 to 19 2
20s 16
30s 43
40s 20
50s 14
60 to 72 2
Missing 2
Never Married 45
Married 32
Divorced or Separated 23
Widowed 0
One Adult with Children 23
One Adult without Children 16
Two or more Adults with Children 50
Two or more Adults w/o Children 9
1 41
2 48
3 7
4 0
5 or more 5
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Demographics
Marital Status
Household Type
Adults in Household
Household Composition
0 25
1 18
2 16
3 16
4 2
5 or more 20
Did not Complete High School 7
Completed High School or GED 27
Attended College 39
Completed 2-year Degree 14
Completed 4-year Degree or more 14
Employed Full-time 70
Employed Part-time 11
Unemployed 0
Not Working 11
Student, not Working 0
Student, also Working 7
Yes 11
No 89
0 to 49 18
50 to 74 11
75 to 99 11
100 to 124 23
125 to 149 14
150 to 174 5
175 to 199 2
200 to 686 7
Missing 9
Never 45
Formerly 55
Currently 11
Yes 16
No 82
Missing 2
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (%)
Children in Household
Education and Employment
Financial
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Education
Employment
Yes 11
No 89
Missing 0
Yes 55
No 20
Missing 25
Yes 39
No 36
Missing 25
Home Purchase 64
Self-employment 32
Post-secondary Education 5
Yes 2
No 70
Missing 27
Yes 5
No 68
Missing 27
Yes 9
No 91
Missing 0
Passbook Savings Account 43
Checking 36
Both 25
Either 55
Zero 100
1 to 6 0
7 to 12 0
13 to 18 0
Missing 0
Bank Account
Hours of General Financial Education 
Attended
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of Matched 
Withdrawal
Previous Relationship with Host 
Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
Direct Deposit to IDA Account
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
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Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Income 
Source (% )
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (% )
Wage-employment 44 1,328 1,400 0 3,000 0 86 80
Government Benefits 44 152 0 0 1,100 0 25 14
Pensions 44 5 0 0 200 0 2 0
Investments 40 0 0 0 0 4 0 0
    Recurrent Sources 40 1,515 1,512 0 3,000 4 98 95
Self-employment 44 130 0 0 3,167 0 11 4
Child Support 44 29 0 0 425 0 0 0
Gifts 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Sources 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    Intermittent Sources 44 159 0 0 3,167 0 18 5
Total Income 40 1,630 1,592 400 3,241 4 100 100
Income/Poverty 40 1.08 1.02 0.00 3.27 4
Income for Participants for Minnesota Tribes
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (% )
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(% )
Passbook Account 42 134 0 0 3,500 2 40 4
Checking Account 42 98 0 0 2,000 2 33 0
    Total Liquid Assets 40 237 3 0 4,000 4 50 5
Home 41 10,718 0 0 75,000 3 41 30
Car 36 4,333 2,250 0 20,000 8 86 53
Business 44 2,045 0 0 60,000 0 5 2
Land or Property 44 1,095 0 0 18,500 0 9 4
Investments 41 583 0 0 12,000 3 24 7
    Total Illiquid Assets 32 22,410 10,300 0 137,000 12 91 95
Total Assets 30 18,379 7,000 0 76,500 14 93 100
Total Liabilities 18 20,637 7,910 0 175,000 26
        Net Worth 15 1,602 0 -5,300 15,000 29
Assets of Participants for Minnesota Tribes
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Enrollment, Deposits and Withdrawals 
 
As of March 31, 2001, 44 participants were enrolled in the Minnesota Tribes region.  The 
average monthly net deposit (AMND)—defined as net deposits divided by months of 
participation—was $15.24, and none of the participants had made a matched withdrawal.  About 
16 percent of participants had made unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances. 
 
The average length of participation was 8.8 months, and the average number of months per year 
with a deposit was 5.8 (deposit frequency was 48 percent).  Gross deposits per month in all 
months were $16.22.  Excluding months without deposits, gross deposits per month were $33.76. 
 
 
Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Liability 
Value by Type 
(%)
Home Mortgage 32 4,888 0 0 45,000 12 22 19
Car Loan 27 4,886 3,400 0 20,000 17 74 52
Business Loan 43 1,163 0 0 50,000 1 2 2
Land or Property Mortgage 42 595 0 0 15,000 2 5 4
Family and Friends Debt 43 1,616 0 0 60,000 1 19 4
Household Bills 43 180 0 0 2,000 1 23 9
Medical Bills 44 293 0 0 7,000 0 25 2
Credit-card 41 385 0 0 5,000 3 20 5
Student Loans 42 319 0 0 4,200 2 17 3
    Total Liabilities 18 20,637 7,910 0 175,000 26 83 100
Total Assets 30 18,379 7,000 0 76,500 14 93
    Net Worth 15 1,602 0 -5,300 15,000 29
Liabilities of Participants for Minnesota Tribes
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 6,298
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 430
Total unmatched withdrawals (430)      
Net deposits 5,868 17,603 23,471
    Matchable balances 5,868 17,603 23,471
    Matched withdrawals 0 0 0
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative Dollars) for Minnesota Tribes
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Participant Characteristics (N = 42) 
           Gender %
Female 81
Male 19
Population 2,500 or more 43
Population less than 2,500 57
African-American 0
Asian-American or Pacific Islander 0
Caucasian 98
Hispanic 0
Native American 0
Other 2
13 to 19 0
20s 19
30s 36
40s 33
50s 10
60 to 72 2
Missing 0
Never Married 14
Married 40
Divorced or Separated 43
Widowed 2
One Adult with Children 45
One Adult without Children 7
Two or more Adults with Children 38
Two or more Adults w/o Children 10
1 52
2 43
3 5
4 0
5 or more 0
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Demographics
Marital Status
Household Type
Adults in Household
Household Composition
0 17
1 14
2 38
3 21
4 5
5 or more 5
Did not Complete High School 5
Completed High School or GED 10
Attended College 40
Completed 2-year Degree 12
Completed 4-year Degree or more 33
Employed Full-time 69
Employed Part-time 24
Unemployed 0
Not Working 0
Student, not Working 0
Student, also Working 7
Yes 21
No 79
0 to 49 12
50 to 74 19
75 to 99 19
100 to 124 10
125 to 149 17
150 to 174 14
175 to 199 5
200 to 686 0
Missing 5
Never 45
Formerly 55
Currently 0
Yes 7
No 93
Missing 0
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (%)
Children in Household
Education and Employment
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Education
Employment
Yes 5
No 95
Missing 0
Yes 86
No 14
Missing 0
Yes 57
No 43
Missing 0
Home Purchase 60
Self-employment 21
Post-secondary Education 19
Yes 52
No 48
Missing 0
Yes 21
No 79
Missing 0
Yes 5
No 95
Missing 0
Passbook Savings Account 43
Checking 98
Both 43
Either 98
Zero 19
1 to 6 43
7 to 12 31
13 to 18 5
Missing 2
Hours of General Financial 
Education Attended
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of Matched 
Withdrawal
Previous Relationship with Host 
Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
Direct Deposit to IDA Account
Bank Account
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
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Income, Assets and Liabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Income 
Source (%)
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 42 1,170 1,188 0 2,700 0 90 74
Government Benefits 42 102 0 0 1,257 0 17 8
Pensions 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Investments 40 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
    Recurrent Sources 40 1,231 1,221 0 2,700 2 90 82
Self-employment 42 103 0 0 1,260 0 17 9
Child Support 42 105 0 0 1,168 0 0 0
Gifts 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Sources 42 25 0 0 1,000 0 5 1
    Intermittent Sources 42 233 0 0 1,260 0 43 18
Total Income 40 1,475 1,494 150 3,386 2 100 100
Income/Poverty 40 1.02 0.98 0.12 1.95 2
Income for Participants for West Central Initiative
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 41 259 0 0 3,000 1 41 5
Checking Account 42 438 104 0 4,000 0 98 8
    Total Liquid Assets 41 688 120 0 4,500 1 98 12
Home 42 17,514 0 0 104,000 0 33 22
Car 41 3,521 3,000 0 12,471 1 95 55
Business 42 1,143 0 0 25,000 0 19 5
Land or Property 42 440 0 0 15,000 0 5 1
Investments 41 1,559 0 0 23,000 1 29 5
    Total Illiquid Assets 40 22,915 5,350 0 107,000 2 98 88
Total Assets 39 23,062 5,320 200 107,075 3 100 100
Total Liabilities 12 23,791 21,563 0 82,453 30
        Net Worth 11 2,433 200 -23,800 54,001 31
Assets of Participants for West Central Initiative 
  Appendix B  71 
Center for Social Development 
          Washington University in St. Louis 
 
 
 
 
Enrollment, Deposits and Withdrawals 
 
As of March 31, 2001, 42 participants were enrolled in the West Central Initiative region.  
The average monthly net deposit (AMND)—defined as net deposits divided by months of 
participation—was $26.80, and 5 percent of participants (two participant) had made 
matched withdrawals.  About 14 percent of participants had made unmatched 
withdrawals from matchable balances. 
 
The average length of participation was 11.2 months, and the average number of months 
per year with a deposit was 8.9 (deposit frequency was 74 percent).  Gross deposits per 
month in all months were $28.03.  Excluding months without deposits, gross deposits per 
month were $37.99. 
 
Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Liability 
Value by Type 
(%)
Home Mortgage 39 10,901 0 0 80,000 3 28 35
Car Loan 13 3,166 3,000 0 12,000 29 77 32
Business Loan 37 405 0 0 15,000 5 3 0
Land or Property Mortgage 41 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Family and Friends Debt 42 193 0 0 3,000 0 21 0
Household Bills 42 26 0 0 710 0 7 0
Medical Bills 42 252 0 0 2,000 0 31 1
Credit-card 42 1,695 115 0 13,000 0 52 8
Student Loans 42 2,695 0 0 39,000 0 24 24
    Total Liabilities 12 23,791 21,563 0 82,453 30 92 100
Total Assets 39 23,062 5,320 200 107,075 3 100
    Net Worth 11 2,433 200 -23,800 54,001 31
Liabilities of Participants for West Central Initiative
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 13,177
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 608
Total unmatched withdrawals (608)      
Net deposits 12,569 37,707 50,276
    Matchable balances 11,999 35,996 47,995
    Matched withdrawals 570 1,711 2,281
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative Dollars) for West Central Initiative
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Participant Characteristics (N = 44) 
 
           Gender %
Female 89
Male 11
Population 2,500 or more 57
Population less than 2,500 43
African-American 16
Asian-American or Pacific Islander 0
Caucasian 82
Hispanic 0
Native American 2
Other 0
13 to 19 2
20s 18
30s 50
40s 30
50s 0
60 to 72 0
Missing 0
Household Composition
Never Married 70
Married 18
Divorced or Separated 11
Widowed 0
One Adult with Children 66
One Adult without Children 7
Two or more Adults with Children 23
Two or more Adults w/o Children 5
1 73
2 27
3 0
4 0
5 or more 0
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Demographics
Marital Status
Household Type
Adults in Household
0 11
1 41
2 25
3 16
4 2
5 or more 5
Education and Employment
Did not Complete High School 0
Completed High School or GED 43
Attended College 25
Completed 2-year Degree 14
Completed 4-year Degree or more 18
Employed Full-time 52
Employed Part-time 39
Unemployed 0
Not Working 0
Student, not Working 0
Student, also Working 9
Yes 9
No 91
Financial
0 to 49 14
50 to 74 20
75 to 99 11
100 to 124 16
125 to 149 14
150 to 174 14
175 to 199 7
200 to 686 5
Missing 0
Never 30
Formerly 70
Currently 5
Yes 20
No 80
Missing 0
Children in Household
Education
Employment
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (%)
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Yes 9
No 91
Missing 0
Yes 93
No 7
Missing 0
Yes 27
No 73
Missing 0
Home Purchase 70
Self-employment 16
Post-secondary Education 14
Yes 61
No 39
Missing 0
Yes 5
No 95
Missing 0
Yes 5
No 95
Missing 0
Passbook Savings Account 64
Checking 75
Both 48
Either 91
Zero 30
1 to 6 20
7 to 12 14
13 to 18 36
Missing 0
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Direct Deposit to IDA Account
Bank Account
Hours of General Financial 
Education Attended
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of Matched 
Withdrawal
Previous Relationship with Host 
Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
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Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Income 
Source (%)
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 44 1,114 1,127 0 2,355 0 98 83
Government Benefits 44 75 0 0 702 0 18 7
Pensions 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Investments 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    Recurrent Sources 44 1,189 1,300 134 2,355 0 100 90
Self-employment 44 14 0 0 415 0 5 2
Child Support 44 113 0 0 800 0 0 0
Gifts 44 3 0 0 132 0 2 0
Other Sources 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    Intermittent Sources 44 130 0 0 800 0 32 10
Total Income 44 1,319 1,369 134 2,355 0 100 100
Income/Poverty 44 1.08 1.06 0.05 2.40 0
Income for Participants for Initiative Fund
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 44 282 20 0 3,000 0 64 12
Checking Account 44 159 55 0 1,000 0 75 7
    Total Liquid Assets 44 441 145 0 3,300 0 91 19
Home 44 6,686 0 0 76,000 0 16 14
Car 44 3,525 1,200 0 20,000 0 80 56
Business 44 280 0 0 10,000 0 7 3
Land or Property 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Investments 44 373 0 0 4,500 0 18 8
    Total Illiquid Assets 44 10,864 3,565 0 91,000 0 86 81
Total Assets 44 11,305 3,676 0 92,050 0 95 100
Total Liabilities 27 13,791 5,800 0 68,000 17
        Net Worth 27 -3,361 -1,000 -67,237 25,050 17
Assets of Participants for Initiative Fund Regional Cluster
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Enrollment, Deposits and Withdrawals 
 
As of March 31, 2001, 44 participants were enrolled in the Initiative Fund Regional Cluster 
region.  The average monthly net deposit (AMND)—defined as net deposits divided by months 
of participation—was $27.88, and 2 percent of participants (one participant) had made matched 
withdrawals.  About 25 percent of participants had made unmatched withdrawals from 
matchable balances. 
 
The average length of participation was 10.6 months, and the average number of months per year 
with a deposit was 8.9 (deposit frequency was 74 percent).  Gross deposits per month in all 
months were $30.20.  Excluding months without deposits, gross deposits per month were $40.91. 
 
 
Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Liability 
Value by Type 
(%)
Home Mortgage 43 5,209 0 0 53,000 1 14 6
Car Loan 27 3,651 1,800 0 20,000 17 67 45
Business Loan 42 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
Land or Property Mortgage 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Family and Friends Debt 44 860 0 0 15,000 0 30 6
Household Bills 44 185 0 0 4,500 0 16 4
Medical Bills 44 188 0 0 3,000 0 23 5
Credit-card 44 846 0 0 8,519 0 34 14
Student Loans 44 4,486 0 0 60,000 0 30 19
    Total Liabilities 27 13,791 5,800 0 68,000 17 93 100
Total Assets 44 11,305 3,676 0 92,050 0 95
    Net Worth 27 -3,361 -1,000 -67,237 25,050 17
Liabilities of Participants for Initiative Fund
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 14,111
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 1,119
Total unmatched withdrawals (1,119)   
Net deposits 12,992 38,975 51,967
    Matchable balances 12,752 38,255 51,007
    Matched withdrawals 240 720 960
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative Dollars) for Initiative Fund 
Regional Cluster
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Participant Characteristics (N = 48) 
 
           Gender %
Female 73
Male 27
Race/Ethnicity 56
Population less than 2,500 44
African-American 0
Asian-American or Pacific Islander 0
Caucasian 81
Hispanic 17
Native American 2
Other 0
13 to 19 0
20s 38
30s 33
40s 23
50s 6
60 to 72 0
Missing 0
Never Married 25
Married 31
Divorced or Separated 44
Widowed 0
One Adult with Children 52
One Adult without Children 6
Two or more Adults with Children 40
Two or more Adults w/o Children 2
1 58
2 42
3 0
4 0
5 or more 0
Household Composition
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Demographics
Marital Status
Household Type
Adults in Household
0 8
1 23
2 38
3 15
4 15
5 or more 2
Did not Complete High School 21
Completed High School or GED 23
Attended College 35
Completed 2-year Degree 13
Completed 4-year Degree or more 8
Employed Full-time 71
Employed Part-time 19
Unemployed 0
Not Working 4
Student, not Working 0
Student, also Working 6
Yes 13
No 88
0 to 49 10
50 to 74 13
75 to 99 23
100 to 124 17
125 to 149 21
150 to 174 10
175 to 199 4
200 to 686 2
Missing 0
Never 35
Formerly 65
Currently 10
Yes 27
No 73
Missing 0
Education and Employment
Financial
Children in Household
Education
Employment
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (%)
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Yes 15
No 85
Missing 0
Yes 67
No 33
Missing 0
Yes 40
No 60
Missing 0
Home Purchase 63
Self-employment 23
Post-secondary Education 15
Yes 85
No 15
Missing 0
Yes 10
No 90
Missing 0
Yes 4
No 96
Missing 0
Passbook Savings Account 42
Checking 67
Both 27
Either 81
Zero 27
1 to 6 13
7 to 12 33
13 to 18 27
Missing 0
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Direct Deposit to IDA Account
Bank Account
Hours of General Financial 
Education Attended
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of Matched 
Withdrawal
Previous Relationship with Host 
Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
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Income, Assets and Liabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Income 
Source (%)
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 48 1,199 1,299 0 2,514 0 92 76
Government Benefits 48 135 0 0 992 0 31 11
Pensions 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Investments 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    Recurrent Sources 48 1,334 1,448 0 2,984 0 94 87
Self-employment 48 74 0 0 1,485 0 13 6
Child Support 48 92 0 0 630 0 0 0
Gifts 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Sources 48 8 0 0 400 0 2 0
    Intermittent Sources 48 174 0 0 1,512 0 33 13
Total Income 48 1,508 1,514 583 2,984 0 100 100
Income/Poverty 48 1.08 1.09 0.04 2.16 0
Income for Participants for Southwest
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 48 102 0 0 1,500 0 42 6
Checking Account 48 237 73 0 3,705 0 67 7
    Total Liquid Assets 48 340 100 0 3,705 0 81 13
Home 48 10,288 0 0 90,000 0 19 16
Car 48 3,860 2,050 0 13,000 0 94 64
Business 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Land or Property 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Investments 48 565 0 0 10,000 0 31 7
    Total Illiquid Assets 48 14,712 4,000 0 92,200 0 96 87
Total Assets 48 15,052 4,750 40 92,400 0 100 100
Total Liabilities 28 13,858 4,435 0 80,350 20
        Net Worth 28 2,549 704 -9,350 15,800 20
Assets of Participants for Southwest Minnesota Foundation
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Enrollment, Deposits and Withdrawals 
 
As of March 31, 2001, 48 participants were enrolled in the Southwest Minnesota 
Foundation region.  The average monthly net deposit (AMND)—defined as net deposits 
divided by months of participation—was $25.04, and 4 percent of participants (two 
participant) had made matched withdrawals.  About 23 percent of participants had made 
unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances. 
 
The average length of participation was 8.7 months, and the average number of months 
per year with a deposit was 9.0 (deposit frequency was 75 percent).  Gross deposits per 
month in all months were $28.01.  Excluding months without deposits, gross deposits per 
month were $37.31. 
 
Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Liability 
Value by Type 
(%)
Home Mortgage 47 7,372 0 0 86,000 1 17 17
Car Loan 29 2,955 1,950 0 11,221 19 86 54
Business Loan 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Land or Property Mortgage 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Family and Friends Debt 48 492 0 0 20,000 0 13 6
Household Bills 48 83 0 0 1,100 0 15 3
Medical Bills 48 300 0 0 3,000 0 38 8
Credit-card 48 379 0 0 12,511 0 25 4
Student Loans 48 1,028 0 0 12,000 0 23 9
    Total Liabilities 28 13,858 4,435 0 80,350 20 89 100
Total Assets 48 15,052 4,750 40 92,400 0 100
    Net Worth 28 2,549 704 -9,350 15,800 20
Liabilities of Participants for Southwest
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 11,706
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 1,263
Total unmatched withdrawals (1,263)   
Net deposits 10,443 31,328 41,771
    Matchable balances 10,052 30,157 40,209
    Matched withdrawals 390 1,171 1,562
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative Dollars) for Southwest 
Minnesota Foundation
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Participant Characteristics (N = 44) 
 
           G ender %
Female 86
M ale 14
Population 2,500 or more 39
Population less than 2,500 61
African-American 5
Asian-American or Pacific Islander 7
Caucasian 86
Hispanic 2
Native American 0
Other 0
13 to 19 0
20s 23
30s 32
40s 39
50s 7
60 to 72 0
M issing 0
Never M arried 30
M arried 36
Divorced or Separated 30
W idowed 5
One Adult with Children 45
One Adult without Children 9
Two or more Adults with Children 43
Two or more Adults w/o Children 2
1 55
2 45
3 0
4 0
5 or more 0
Adults in H ousehold
H ousehold Composition
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Demographics
M arital Status
H ousehold Type
0 11
1 34
2 30
3 7
4 16
5 or more 2
Did not Complete High School 5
Completed High School or GED 11
Attended College 39
Completed 2-year Degree 16
Completed 4-year Degree or more 30
Employed Full-time 50
Employed Part-time 34
Unemployed 0
Not Working 2
Student, not Working 2
Student, also Working 11
Yes 25
No 75
0 to 49 14
50 to 74 11
75 to 99 23
100 to 124 18
125 to 149 18
150 to 174 9
175 to 199 7
200 to 686 0
Missing 0
Never 30
Formerly 70
Currently 18
Yes 27
No 70
Missing 2
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (%)
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Children in Household
Education
Employment
Education and Employment
Financial
Yes 11
No 89
Missing 0
Yes 73
No 27
Missing 0
Yes 48
No 50
Missing 2
Home Purchase 57
Self-employment 20
Post-secondary Education 23
Yes 66
No 34
Missing 0
Yes 20
No 80
Missing 0
Yes 20
No 80
Missing 0
Passbook Savings Account 48
Checking 80
Both 41
Either 86
Zero 32
1 to 6 18
7 to 12 41
13 to 18 9
Missing 0
Hours of General Financial 
Education Attended
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of Matched 
Withdrawal
Previous Relationship with Host 
Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Direct Deposit to IDA Account
Bank Account
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Income, Assets and Liabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Income 
Source (%)
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 44 1,069 1,129 0 2,416 0 95 74
Government Benefits 44 181 0 0 968 0 41 15
Pensions 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Investments 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    Recurrent Sources 44 1,250 1,200 500 2,416 0 100 90
Self-employment 44 163 0 0 1,667 0 23 8
Child Support 44 27 0 0 356 0 0 0
Gifts 44 10 0 0 308 0 5 1
Other Sources 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    Intermittent Sources 44 201 0 0 1,908 0 34 10
Total Income 44 1,451 1,361 515 2,477 0 100 100
Income/Poverty 44 1.01 1.01 0.11 1.86 0
Income for Participants for South Central Minnesota Regional Cluster
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 44 191 0 0 2,455 0 48 2
Checking Account 43 278 100 0 2,500 1 79 12
    Total Liquid Assets 43 473 125 0 4,237 1 86 13
Home 44 15,354 0 0 95,000 0 34 31
Car 40 2,991 1,800 0 13,868 4 90 49
Business 44 2,580 0 0 90,000 0 11 4
Land or Property 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Investments 44 692 0 0 12,250 0 23 3
    Total Illiquid Assets 40 23,479 4,065 0 178,500 4 93 87
Total Assets 39 24,559 4,450 80 178,560 5 100 100
Total Liabilities 24 22,869 12,812 0 130,700 20
        Net Worth 23 2,263 -650 -65,740 61,893 21
Assets of Participants for South Central Minnesota Regional Cluster
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Enrollment, Deposits and Withdrawals 
 
As of March 31, 2001, 44 participants were enrolled in the Initiative Fund of South 
Central Minnesota Regional Cluster.  The average monthly net deposit (AMND)—
defined as net deposits divided by months of participation—was $30.21, and 2 percent of 
participants (one participant) had made matched withdrawals.  About 25 percent of 
participants had made unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances. 
 
The average length of participation was 9.4 months, and the average number of months 
per year with a deposit was 10.6 (deposit frequency was 88 percent).  Gross deposits per 
month in all months were $31.93.  Excluding months without deposits, gross deposits per 
month were $36.42. 
 
Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Liability 
Value by Type 
(%)
Home Mortgage 39 6,528 0 0 50,000 5 23 21
Car Loan 26 2,558 1,750 0 11,000 18 65 27
Business Loan 42 2,214 0 0 75,000 2 7 5
Land or Property Mortgage 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Family and Friends Debt 44 1,859 0 0 63,000 0 25 6
Household Bills 44 176 0 0 5,000 0 16 7
Medical Bills 44 354 0 0 9,999 0 27 9
Credit-card 44 718 0 0 5,000 0 43 10
Student Loans 44 2,516 0 0 20,000 0 32 15
    Total Liabilities 24 22,869 12,812 0 130,700 20 92 100
Total Assets 39 24,559 4,450 80 178,560 5 100
    Net Worth 23 2,263 -650 -65,740 61,893 21
Liabilities of Participants for South Central Minnesota Regional Cluster
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 13,308
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 802
Total unmatched withdrawals (802)       
Net deposits 12,506 37,518 50,024
    Matchable balances 12,423 37,270 49,693
    Matched withdrawals 83 248 331
  Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative Dollars)
 for South Central Minnesota Regional Cluster
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Participant Characteristics (N = 201) 
 
 
           Gender %
Female 88
Male 12
Population 2,500 or more 98
Population less than 2,500 2
African-American 36
Asian-American or Pacific Islander 4
Caucasian 51
Hispanic 2
Native American 4
Other 2
13 to 19 0
20s 26
30s 42
40s 23
50s 5
60 to 72 1
Missing 1
Never Married 59
Married 16
Divorced or Separated 23
Widowed 1
One Adult with Children 61
One Adult without Children 11
Two or more Adults with Children 25
Two or more Adults w/o Children 2
1 72
2 25
3 2
4 0
5 or more 0
Household Composition
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Demographics
Marital Status
Household Type
Adults in Household
0 13
1 29
2 28
3 18
4 8
5 or more 2
Did not Complete High School 7
Completed High School or GED 21
Attended College 46
Completed 2-year Degree 4
Completed 4-year Degree or more 21
Employed Full-time 54
Employed Part-time 33
Unemployed 1
Not Working 2
Student, not Working 1
Student, also Working 8
Yes 13
No 87
0 to 49 14
50 to 74 13
75 to 99 18
100 to 124 18
125 to 149 15
150 to 174 11
175 to 199 4
200 to 686 4
Missing 1
Never 36
Formerly 62
Currently 16
Yes 14
No 83
Missing 2
Education and Employment
Financial
Children in Household
Education
Employment
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (%)
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Yes 8
No 89
Missing 3
Yes 78
No 21
Missing 1
Yes 28
No 70
Missing 1
Home Purchase 71
Self-employment 19
Post-secondary Education 10
Yes 39
No 61
Missing 0
Yes 16
No 81
Missing 2
Yes 16
No 78
Missing 5
Passbook Savings Account 54
Checking 75
Both 41
Either 88
Zero 22
1 to 6 10
7 to 12 12
13 to 18 52
Missing 4
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Direct Deposit to IDA Account
Bank Account
Hours of General Financial 
Education Attended
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of Matched 
Withdrawal
Previous Relationship with Host 
Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
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Income, Assets and Liabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Income 
Source (%)
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 201 1,099 1,100 0 2,500 0 89 76
Government Benefits 201 139 0 0 2,144 0 25 12
Pensions 201 3 0 0 648 0 0 0
Investments 200 3 0 0 500 1 2 0
    Recurrent Sources 199 1,248 1,238 0 2,854 2 96 88
Self-employment 201 93 0 0 2,400 0 13 7
Child Support 201 61 0 0 1,000 0 0 0
Gifts 201 3 0 0 450 0 1 0
Other Sources 200 2 0 0 380 1 1 0
    Intermittent Sources 199 160 0 0 2,750 2 34 12
Total Income 198 1,405 1,401 90 4,478 3 100 100
Income/Poverty 198 1.07 1.04 0.00 3.15 3
Income for Participants for Metro Area
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 196 233 5 0 4,000 5 53 12
Checking Account 200 305 100 0 4,500 1 75 19
    Total Liquid Assets 195 546 200 0 4,500 6 88 31
Home 201 14,259 0 0 170,000 0 18 16
Car 195 2,746 1,100 0 25,000 6 72 48
Business 198 268 0 0 18,000 3 5 2
Land or Property 200 60 0 0 12,000 1 1 0
Investments 201 211 0 0 10,000 0 14 4
    Total Illiquid Assets 191 16,162 1,600 0 153,000 10 75 69
Total Assets 185 16,366 2,050 0 154,500 16 93 100
Total Liabilities 96 12,550 2,459 0 112,400 105
        Net Worth 93 330 0 -15,206 27,918 108
Assets of Participants for Metro Area Regional Cluster
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Enrollment, Deposits and Withdrawals 
 
As of March 31, 2001, 201 participants were enrolled in the Metro Area Regional Cluster.  The 
average monthly net deposit (AMND)—defined as net deposits divided by months of 
participation—was $26.04, and none of the participants had made a matched withdrawal.  About 
19 percent of participants had made unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances. 
 
The average length of participation was 10.6 months, and the average number of months per year 
with a deposit was 8.6 (deposit frequency was 72 percent).  Gross deposits per month in all 
months were $28.11.  Excluding months without deposits, gross deposits per month were $39.11. 
 
Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Liability 
Value by Type 
(%)
Home Mortgage 188 8,124 0 0 140,000 13 12 13
Car Loan 109 2,531 0 0 20,000 92 46 35
Business Loan 191 14 0 0 2,600 10 1 0
Land or Property Mortgage 199 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
Family and Friends Debt 200 445 0 0 13,000 1 23 7
Household Bills 198 157 0 0 3,000 3 24 13
Medical Bills 196 214 0 0 6,000 5 23 7
Credit-card 199 537 0 0 8,000 2 29 15
Student Loans 200 950 0 0 50,000 1 13 9
    Total Liabilities 96 12,550 2,459 0 112,400 105 78 100
Total Assets 185 16,366 2,050 0 154,500 16 93
    Net Worth 93 330 0 -15,206 27,918 108
Liabilities of Participants for Metro Area Regional Cluster
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 60,258
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 4,645
Total unmatched withdrawals (4,645)   
Net deposits 55,613 166,839 222,451
    Matchable balances 55,613 166,839 222,451
    Matched withdrawals 0 0 0
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative Dollars) for Metro Area 
Regional Cluster
